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FOREWORD 
This paper  represents  the  written version of a lecture given a t  IIASA in Sep- 
tember 1984 under the auspices of the  Science & Technology and the  Regional 
Issues projects.  In i t s  cu r r en t  form i t  will appear  a s  a chapter  in the  forthcoming 
IIASA book, Complexity,  Language a n d  Life: Mathematical Approaches, J .  Casti 
and A. Karlqvist. eds. 
Boris Segerstahl 
Leader 
Science & Technology Program 

ABSTRACT 
This paper  explores  t he  idea that  life comprises a language-like system. The 
arguments a r e  car r ied  out against t he  background of t he  neo-Darwinian theory of 
evolution. The principal conclusion is the  dilemma that  if life is  a language-like 
system, then cer ta in  concepts a r e  missing from the  Darwinian paradigm; if not, 
then Darwinian thought is  suspicious in t h e  sense tha t  i ts  principles do not natur- 
ally apply t o  cognate disciplines. 

Dnvid Berlinski i s  a Researcher a t  the Inst i tut  des  Hautes E'tudes Scientifique, 
Bur-sur-yvet te .  Par i s ,  France. 
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T h e  L a n g u a g e  of Life 
David Berlinski 
In t he  spring of 1984, I delivered two lectures a t  IIASA under t he  title The 
L a n g u a g e  of Life .  Dianne Goodwin was kind enough to  prepare  a verbatim tran- 
scr ipt  of my talks; I have used the  months since then to purge the  written record 
of what I said of i ts  incoherence, vagrant inaccuracies, and general slovenliness. 
This chapter  is a t  once long and terse  - an unhappy combination, and one 
that  makes severe demands of t h e  reader.  Many arguments a r e  highly compressed 
and must be elaborated before they appear convincing. I have not hesitated to 
make use of mathematical concepts in expressing myself; but I draw no mathemati- 
cal conclusions. I thus run the  risk of alienating the  general reader  even as I anta- 
gonize t h e  mathematician. For these reasons, i t  may be helpful if in this introduc- 
tion I endeavor to place this chapter  in a somewhat wider personal and intellectual 
context. 
As i t  stands, The L a n g u a g e  of Life represents a draf t  of one-third of a 
larger work entitled L a n g u a g e ,  Life a n d  Logic.  Another par t  of that  more ambi- 
tious project was delivered a t  IIASA two years ago as a s e t  of lectures. The written 
record of those lectures, which I hope to publish separately as a working paper,  is 
entitled C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  a n d  its D i s c o n t e n t s .  
My aim in L a n g u a g e ,  Life a n d  Logic is to explore a certain complicated com- 
mon ground that  holds between language, on the  one hand, and t h e  graphic a r t s ,  
on the  other.  These a r e  t h e  classic systems of representation of t he  human imagi- 
nation. In both, there  is a curious division between the  system's syntactic and 
semantic structures:  a theory, for example, consists of a finite s e t  of sentences, 
t h e  sentences of words; paint and then pigment comprise a painting; and yet,  
words and sentences, paints and pigments, manage, somehow, to  cohere and. then, 
in a miraculous act  of self-transcendence, to make contact with a distinct and dif- 
ferent external world. The problems of theoretical biology, i t  might seem, have 
nothing much to  do with issues tha t  arise in t he  philosophy of language or  t he  phi- 
losophy of a r t .  Not so. A gene comprises a linear a r ray  of nucleotides that  under 
certain conditions expresses a protein o r  s e t  of proteins. The proteins, in turn,  
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are organized to form a s tructure as complicated as a moose o r  a mouse. The 
nucleotides are plainly alphabetic o r  typographic in character; the  organism itself 
is rich, complex, complete, continuous, unlike an alphabet. How is i t ,  then, that 
such typographic structures as DNA manage to express so much tha t  is not typo- 
graphic a t  all? This is a question quite similar to questions that  might be raised 
about language itself, or  works of the graphic arts; and when i t  is pursued, certain 
metaphors and quite peculiar images begin drifting from one subject to the other. 
There is the notion of meaning, of course, which is common to  language, art, and 
life; but also the idea that  life is itself a language-like system; or  that art is 
organic. The relations of satisfaction, representation, and expression. while for- 
mally distinct. of course, nonetheless display points of contact. In order to 
explain how i t  is that  a painting may represent a face, f o r  example, one has 
recourse to the notion of a metaphor, a concept from the philosophy of language 
and linguistics; to make sense of gene expression, one deals in concepts such as 
code, codon, information, and regulation. In a general way, a theory, a painting, 
and a gene belong to the class of interpreted or  sigmficant typographic objects. I t  
is for this reason that  i t  has seemed to m e  profitable to explore some of the con- 
cerns of theoretical biology and the  philosophy of art and language in a single 
volume. 
Within the context of this chapter ,  my aim is to explore the  ramifications of 
a controlling metaphor: the  idea tha t  life comprises a language-like system. I do 
this against the background of the  neo-Darwinian theory of evolution - the most 
global and comprehensive scheme of thought in theoretical biology. My argument 
a t  its most general is constructed as a dilemma: if life is a language-like system. 
then certain concepts are missing from Darwinian thought; if not. then Darwinian 
thought is suspicious in the  sense tha t  its principles do not naturally apply to cog- 
nate disciplines. The intellectual pattern to this chapter is thus one of movement 
between two unyielding points, a kind of whiplash. 
Part One establishes the  historical and contemporary background to 
D d n i a n  thought; and makes the  argument that much of biology cannot be 
reduced to physics. In Part Two. I consider the confluence of certain concepts: 
distance in the met r i c  spaces of organisms and of strings, metric spaces in phase. 
complexity, simplicity, Kotmogorov complexity. the ideas of a weak theory, and a 
language-like system. Part Three plays off concepts of probability against the  
hypothesis that molecular biological words are high in Kolmogorov complexity - 
with results that are inconclusive. In Part Four, I examine evolution or  biological 
change as a process involving paths of proteins. The discussion is set in the  
mathematical contexts of ergodic theory and information theory. In many 
respects, the classical concepts of information and entropy are most natural in 
discussing topics such as the  generation of protein paths by means of stochastic 
devices; but there is a connection between Kolmogorov complexity and entropy in 
the sense of information theory. which remains to be explored. Almost all of Part 
Four represents a tentative exploration of concepts that require, and will no 
doubt receive, a f a r  fuller mathematical treatment. 
Many of the points that  I make in this paper I first discussed with M. P. 
Schutzenberger in Paris in 1979 and 1980. Indeed, it was our intention and hope to 
publish jointly a monograph on theoretical biology. This has not come to pass. Still, 
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to the  extent  that  my ideas a r e  interesting, they a re  his; to  the  extent  that  they 
a re  not. they are mine. 
John Casti read the  penultimate draf t  of this essay and discovered any 
number of embarrassing errors .  I am grateful for his s t e rn  advice, which I have 
endeavored to  heed. 
PART ONE 
A System of Belief 
The natural thought that  theoretical biology comprises a kind of intellectual 
Lapland owes much to the  idea tha t  biology itself is somehow a derivative science, 
an analogue to automotive engineering o r  dairy management, and, in any case, 
devoid of those special principles that  lend to the  physical o r  chemical sciences 
their  striking mahogany lustre. This is the  position for which J.J.C. Smart (1963) 
provided a classic argument in Philosophy and Scientific Realism. [l] Analytic 
philosophers, for t he  most par t ,  agree tha t  nothing in the  nature of things com- 
pels them to learn organic chemistry; Feyerabend. Putnam, and Kuhn have won- 
dered whether a n y  discipline can properly be reduced to  anything a t  all; and, 
then, whether anything is ever scientific, a t  least in the  old-fashioned and hon- 
orific sense of that  tem.[2] Naive physicists - t he  only kind - are all too happy 
to hear that  among the  sciences physics occupies a position of prominence denied, 
say, to  urban affairs or  agronomy. The result is reductionism from the top down, 
a crude but still violently vigorous flower in the  philosophy of science. The physi- 
cist or  philosopher, with his eye fixed on the  primacy of physics, thus needs to  
sense in the  other  sciences - sociology, neurophysiology, macrame, whatever - 
intimations of physics, however faint. This is easy enough in the  case of biochemis- 
try:  chemistry is physics once removed; biochemistry, physics a t  a double dis- 
tance. Doing biochemistry, t he  theoretician is applying merely the  principles of 
chemistry to living systems: like t he  Pope, his is a reflected radiance. 
In 1831, the  German chemist Uriel Wohler synthesized urea, purely an 
organic compound - the  chief ingredient in urine, actually - from a handful of 
chemicals tha t  he  took from his stock and a revolting mixture of dried horse 
blood. It was thus that  organic chemistry was created: an inauspicious beginning, 
but important, nonetheless, if only because so many European chemists were con- 
vinced that  the attempt to synthesize an organic compound would end inevitably in 
failure. The daring idea tha t  all of life - I am quoting from James Watson's text-  
book (1965), The Molecular Biology of the Gene - will ultimately be understood in 
terms of the  "coordinative interaction of large and small molecules" is now a com- 
monplace among molecular biologists, a fixed point in the  wandering system of 
their  theories and beliefs. The contrary thesis, that  living creatures  go quite 
beyond the reach of chemistry, biochemists regard with t he  alarmed contempt 
they reserve for ideas they a r e  prepared to  dismiss but not discuss. Francis 
Crick, for example, devotes fully a third of his little monograph, Of Molecules and 
Men, to a denunciation of vitalism almost ecclesiastical in i ts  forthrightness and 
utter  lack of detail.[3] Like other men, molecular biologists evidently derive some 
satisfaction from imagining that the orthodoxy they espouse is ceaselessly under 
attack. 
Theoretical biologists still cast their limpid and untroubled gaze over a world 
organized in its largest aspects by Darwinian concepts; and so do high-school 
instructors in biology - hardly a group one would think much inclined to the idea 
of the survival of the fittest; but unlike the theory of relativity, which Einstein 
introduced to a baffled and uncomprehending world in 1905, the Darwinian theory 
of evolution has never quite achieved canonical status in contemporary thought , 
however much like a cold wind over water its influence may have been felt in 
economics, sociology, or  political science. Curiously enough. while molecular gene t- 
ics provides an interpretation for certain Darwinian concepts - those differences 
between organisms that Darwin observed but could not explain - the Darwinian 
theory resists reformulation in terms either of chemistry or  physics. This is a 
point apt to engender controversy. Woodger, Hempel, Nagel; and Quine cast reduc- 
tion as a logical relationship: given two theories, the first may d i r e c t l y  be 
reduced to the second when a mapping of its descriptive apparatus and domain of 
interpretation allows the first to be derived from the second. I am ignoring 
details. now. The standard and, indeed. the sole example of reduction successfully 
achieved involves the derivation of thermodynamics from statistical mechulics. In 
recent years, philosophers have come to regard direct reduction with some unhap- 
piness. There are problems in the interpretation of historical terms: the  
Newtonian concept of mass.  for example; and theories that  once seemed cut from 
the same cloth now appear alarmingly incommensurable. Kenneth Schaffner has 
provided a somewhat more elaborate account of reduction: his definition runs to 
five points.[4] By a corrected t h e o r y ,  he means a theory logically revived to bring 
it  into conformity with current interpretations: Newton upgraded. for example. 
His general scheme for reduction. then, is this: 
(1) All of the  terms in the corrected theory must be matched to terms in the  
reducing theory - a requirement of completeness.  
(2) The corrected theory must be deducible f rom the larger theory, given the 
existence of suitable reduction functions - a requirement of d e r i v a b i l i t  y .  
(3) The corrected theory must indicate why the original theory w a s  incorrect - 
a requirement of epistemological i n s i g h t .  
(4) The original theory must be  explicable in terms of the reducing theory - a 
requirement of cogency.  
(5) The original and corrected theories must resemble each other - a require- 
ment of intellectural s y m m e t r y .  
In the case of theoretical biology. to speak crisply of deriving, say, molecular 
biology from biochemistry is rather  like endeavoring to cut steel with butter: 
there is a certain innocence to the idea that molecular biology has anything Like a 
discernable logical structure. What one actually sees is a m a s s  of descriptive 
detail, a bewildering plethora of hypothetical mechanisms. much by way of anecdo- 
tal evidence, a f e w  tiresome concepts, and an array of metaphors drawn from phy- 
sics, chemistry. information theory, and cybernetics. The definition of reduction 
just cited is, in addition. incomplete. its flagrant inapplicability aside. In Men- 
delian genetics, the concept of a gene is theoretical. and genes figure in that  
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theory as abstract entities. To what should they be pegged in molecular genetics 
in order to reduce the first theory to the second? DNA, quite plainly, but how 
much of the stuff counts as a gene? "Just (enough) to act as a unit of function, " 
argues Michael Ruse, a philosopher whose commitment to prevailing orthodoxy is a 
model of steadfastness.[5] The functions that he has in mind are biochemical: the 
capacity to generate polypeptides; but to my way of thinking, the reduction 
achieved thus is illicit. In biochemistry, the notion of a unit of function is otiose, 
unneeded elsewhere. To the extent that molecular genetics is biochemistry, it 
does not reflect completely Mendelian genetics; to the extent that it does. it is 
not biochemistry, but biochemistry beefed-up by extrinsic concepts, a conceptual 
padded shoulder. What holds in a limited way for molecular genetics holds in a 
much larger way for molecular biology. Concepts such as code and codon, informa- 
tion. complexity, replication, self -organization, stability. negative entropy 
(grotesque on any reckoning), transformation, regulation, feedback, and control - 
the stuff required to make molecular biology work - are scarcely biochemical: the 
biochemist following some placid metabolic pathway need never appeal to them. 
Population genetics, to pursue the argument outward toward increasing generality, 
is a refined and abstract version of Darwin's theory of natural selection. applied 
directly to an imaginary population of genes: selection pressures act directly on 
the molecules themselves, a high wind that cuts through the flesh of life to reach 
its buzzing core. Has one achieved anything like a reduction of Darwinian thought 
to theories that are e s s e n t i a l l y  biochemical, or even vaguely physical? Hardly. 
The usual Darwinian concepts of fitness and selection appear unvaryingly in place. 
These are ideas, it goes without saying, that do not figure in standard accounts of 
biochemistry, which very sensibly treat of valences and bonding angles, enzymes 
and metabolic pathways, fats and polymers - anything but fitness and natural 
selection. To Schaffner's list of five, then, I would add a sixth: n o  r e d u c t i o n  b y  
means  of i n f l a t i o n  - a contingent and cautionary restriction that, for the time 
being at  least, enforces a stern separation between biology and mathematical phy- 
sics. 
The Darwinian theory of evolution is the great, global organizing principle of 
biology, however much molecular biologists may occupy themselves locally in 
determining nucleotide sequences, synthesizing enzymes, or cloning frogs . Those 
biologists who look forward to the withering away of biology in favor of biochemis- 
t ry  and then physics are inevitably neo-Darwinians, and the fact that this theory 
- t h e i r  theory - is impervious to reduction they count as an innocent incon- 
sistency. If mathematical physics offers a vision of reality a t  its most comprehen- 
sive, the Darwinian theory of evolution, like psychoanalysis, Marxism, or the 
Catholic Faith, comprises, instead, a sys t em of bel ief .  Like Hell itself, which is 
said to be protected by walls that are seven miles thick, each such system looks 
especially sturdy from the inside. Standing at  dead center, most people have con- 
siderable difficulty in imagining that an outside exists at  all. 
The Historical Background 
Charles Darwin completed his masterpiece, O n  the O r i g i n  of Species ,  in 
1859. He was then forty-nine, ten years younger than the century, and not a man 
inclined to hasty publication. In the early 1830s, he had journeyed to the islands 
of the South Atlantic as a naturalist aboard H.M.S. The Beagle. The stunning diver- 
sity of plant and animal life that he saw there impressed him deeply. Prevailing 
biological thought had held that each species is somehow fixed and unalterable. 
Looking backward in time along a line of dogs, i t  is dogs all the way. Five years in 
the South Atlantic suggested otherwise to Darwin. The great shambling tortoises 
of the Galapagos, surely the saddest of all sea-going creatures, and countless sub- 
species of the  common finch. seemed to exhibit a pattern in which the spokes of 
geographic variation all radiated back to a common point of origin. The detailed 
sketches that Darwin made of the Galapagos Finch. which he later published in Oh 
the Or ig in  of Species, show what caught his eye. Separated by only a f e w  hun- 
dred miles  of choppy ocean, each subspecies of the finch belongs to a single fam- 
ily; and yet. Darwin noted. one group of birds had developed a short. stubby beak; 
another, living northward, a long, pointed. ra ther  Austrian sort  of nose. The varia- 
tions among the finch were hardly arbitrary: birds that needed long noses got 
them. By 1837. Darwin realized that what held for the  finch might hold for the  
rest of life and this, in turn, suggested the dramatic hypothesis that f a r  from 
being fixed and frozen. the  species that now swarm over t h e  surface of the Earth 
evolved from species that had come before in a continuous, phylogenetic, 
saxophone-like slide. 
What Darwin lacked in 1837 w a s  a theory to account for speciation, but the  
great ideas of fitness and natural selection evidently came to him before 1842, for 
by 1843 he had prepared a version of his vision. and committed it to print in the  
event of his death. H e  then sat on his results in an immensely slow, self-satisfied. 
thoroughly constipated way until news reached him that  A.R. Wallace was about to 
make known h i s  theory of evolution. Wallace. so f a r  as I know. had never traveled 
to the South Atlantic, sensibly choosing, instead, to collect data in the East 
Indies, and. yet, considering the same problem that had earlier vexed Darwin. he 
had hit on precisely Darwin's explanation. The idea that Wallace might hog the 
glory w a s  too much for the melancholic Darwin: he lumbered into print just months 
ahead of his rival; but in science. as elsewhere, even seconds count. 
The theory that Darwin proposed to account for biological change is a con- 
ceptual mechanism of only three parts. It involves, in the first instance, the 
observation that Living creatures vaxy naturally. Each dog is a member of a com- 
mon species and thus dog-like to the bone; but every dog is doggish in his own way: 
some are fast, others slow, some charming. and others bad from the  first, suitable 
only for crime. Darwin wrote before the mechanism of genetic transmission w a s  
understood, but he inclined to the  view that variations in the plant and animal 
kingdoms arise by chance. and are then passed downward from fathers to sons. 
The biological world, Darwin observed, striking now for the second point to 
his three-part explanation. is arranged so that what is needed for survival is gen- 
erally in short supply: food, water, space, tenure. Competition thus ensues, with 
every living thing scrambling to get his share and keep it. The struggle for  life 
favors those organisms whose variations give them a competitive edge. Such is the  
notion of f i tness .  Fast feet make for fitness among the rabbits, even as a feathery 
layer of oiled down makes the Siberian swan a fi t ter foul. A t  any time. those 
creatures fitter than others are more likely to survive and reproduce. The win- 
nowing in life effected by competition Darwin termed n a t u r a l  selection. 
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Working backward, Darwin argued that  present forms of life, various and 
wonderful as they a re ,  arose from common ancestors; working forward, that  biolog- 
ical change, the  transformation of one species to another,  is the  result of small 
increments tha t  accumulate. s tep by inexorable s tep,  across the  generations, until 
natural selection recreates  a species entirely. The Darwinian mechanism is both 
random and determinate. Variations occur without plan o r  purpose - the  luck of 
the  draw; but Nature, like the  House, is aggressive; organized to  cash in on the 
odds. 
The Central Dogma 
Everything tha t  lives, lives just once. To pass from fathers  to  sons is to  pass 
from a copy to a copy. This is not quite immortality, even if carried on forever, but 
i t  counts for something. as every parent knows. The higher organisms reproduce 
themselves sexually, of course, and every copy is copied from a double template. 
Bacteria manage the  matter alone, and so do the  cells within a complex organism, 
which often continue to  grow and reproduce a f te r  their  host has perished, 
unaware, for a brief time, of the  gloomy catastrophe taking place around them. I t  
is possible, I suppose, tha t  each bacterial cell contains a tiny copy of itself, with 
the  copy carrying yet another copy; biologists of t he  early eighteenth century,  
irr i tated and baffled by the  mystery of i t  all, actually thought of reproduction in 
these terms: peering into crude, brass-rimmed microscopes, they persuaded them- 
selves tha t  on the thin, stained glass, they actually saw a homunculus; the  more 
diligent proceeded to  sketch what they seemed to  see. The theory that  emerged 
had the great  virtue of being intellectually repugnant. Much more likely, a t  least 
on the  grounds of reasonableness and common sense, is t he  idea tha t  the  bacterial 
cell contains what Erwin Schroedinger called a code script - a sor t  of cellular 
secretary organizing and recording the  gross and microscopic features of the  cell. 
Such a code scr ipt  would be  logically bound to  double duty. As the  cell divides in 
two, i t ,  too, would have to divide without remainder, doubling itself t o  accommodate 
two bacterial cells where formerly there  was only one. Divided. and thus doubled 
without loss, each code scr ipt  would require powers sufficient to  organize anew 
the  whole of each bacterial cell. The code script  that  Schroedinger (1945) antici- 
pated in his moving and remarkable book, What is Life? - h e  wrote in t he  1940s - 
turns out to  be DNA, a long and sinewy molecule shaped r a the r  like a spiral in two 
strands. The strands themselves are made of stiff sugars, and stuck in t he  sugars, 
like beads in a sticky string, a r e  certain chemical bases: adenine, cytosine, gua- 
nine, and thymine: A, C, T, and G,  in the  now universal abbreviation of biochemists. 
I t  is the  alternation of these bases along the  backbone of DNA tha t  allows the  
molecule to  s tore  information. 
One bacterial cell splits in two: each is a copy of the  first.  All that  physically 
passes from cell to  cell is a s t rand of DNA: the  message that  each generation sends 
faithfully into t he  future is impalpable, abstract  almost, a kind of hidden hum 
against the  coarse w e t  plops of reproduction, gestation, and bir th  itself. James 
Watson and Francis Crick provided the  correct  description of t he  chemical struc- 
ture  of DNA in 1952. They knew, as everyone did, tha t  somehow the  bacterial cell 
in replication sends messages to each of its immediate descendents. They did not 
know how. As i t  turned out, the  chemical structure of DNA. once elaborated. sug- 
gests irresistably a mechanism both for self-replication and the  transmission of 
information. In the  ceU itself, strands of DNA are  woven around each other and 
by an ingenious t w i s t  of biochemistry matched antagonistically: A with T. and C 
with G. A t  reproduction. the  ceU splits the double strand of DNA. Each half floats 
for a time, a gently waving genetic filament; chemical bonds are then repaired as 
each base fastens to  a new antagonist, one simply picked from the ambient broth 
of the cell and clung to, as in a single's bar. The process complete, there are now 
two strands of double-stranded DNA where before there  w a s  only one. 
What this account does not provide is a description of the machinery by 
which the genetic code actually organizes a pair of new cells. To the biochemist, 
the bacterial cell appears as a kind of small sac enclosing an actively throbbing 
biochemical factory; i ts products are  proteins chiefly - long and complex 
molecules composed, in their  turn, of twenty amino acids. The order and composi- 
tion of the amino acids along a given chain determines which protein is which. The 
bacterial cell somehow contains a complete record of the right proteins, as wel l  as 
the instructions required to assemble them directly. The sense of genetic identity 
that marks E. Coli as  E. Coli and not some other bug must thus be expressed in 
the amino acids by means of information stored in the  nucleotides. 
The four nucleotides, w e  now know, are grouped in a triplet code of 64 codons 
or  operating units. A particular codon is composed of three nucleotides. The amino 
acids are matched to the  codons: C-G-A, for example, to  arginnine. In the transla- 
tion of genetic information from DNA to the proteins, the linear ordering of t h e  
codons themselves serves to  induce a corresponding linear ordering first onto an 
intermediary, messenger RNA, and then onto the amino acids themselves - this via 
yet another messenger, transfer RNA. The sequential m n g e m e n t  of the amino 
acids finally fixes the  chemical configuration of the cell. 
Molecular biologists often allude to the steps so described as the Central  
Clogmu, a queer choice of words for a science. 
The dour Austrian monk. Gregor Mendel, founded the science of genetics on 
purely a theoretical notion of a gene, which he likened to a bead on a string. In 
DNA. one looks on genetics bare: the ultimate unit of genetic information is t h e  
nucleotide. All that makes for difference. and hence for charm, in the natural 
world. and which is not t h e  product of culture. art, artifice, accident, or  hard 
work, all this, which is brilliantly expressed in maleable flesh, is a matter of an 
ordering of four biochemical letters along two ropey strands of an immemorial 
acid. 
The Central Dogma describes genetic replication; but the concepts that it 
scouts plainly illuminate Darwinian theory from within. Whether as the result of 
radiation or  chemical accident, letters in the genetic code may be scrambled; one 
letter shifted for another; entire codons replaced, deleted, or  altered. These are 
genetic mutations: arbitrary, because unpredictable; and yet enduring, because 
they are variations in the  genetic message. The theory by which Darwin proposed 
to account for the  origin of species and the nature of biological diversity now 
admits of expression in a single English sentence. Evolution, or  biological change. 
so the revised, the neo-Darwinian theory, runs, is the  result of natural selection 
working on random mutations. 
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PART Two 
Evolutionary Theories 
The popular view of evolution tends to  be a tight shot on a tame subject: t he  
dinosaur, who did not make i t ;  t he  shark,  who did; but t he  maturation of an organ- 
ism is itself much like t h e  evolution of a species; only our intimate acquaintance 
with its precise and unhesitating character  suggests, misleadingly, I think, that  
t h e  two processes differ in degree of freedom. Psychology, economics, urban 
affairs, anthropology, political science, and history also describe processes that  
begin in a s ta te  of satisfying and undemanding simplicity, and end la ter  with 
everything complex, unfathomable, chaotic. The contrast  to physics is sobering. 
The dynamics of evolutionary theories are often divided into two conceptual 
stages. In economics, t he re  a r e  macro- and micro-economic theories, aggregate 
demand versus the  theory of t h e  firm: within linguistics, language a t  t he  continu- 
ous level of speech. and language some levels below, discrete,  a matter of t h e  con- 
catenation of words o r  morphemes. Biology, too, is double-tiered: above, t h e  organ- 
ism prances; unseen, below, a t  a separate  level, i ts  life is organized around the  
alphabetic nucleotides. 
Metric Spaces 
By a metric space S I mean a space upon which a function 
has been defined. assigning to  each pair of points s , s ' in S a nonnegative real 
number - the  dis tance d (s  , s ') - and satisfying t h e  usual axioms: 
d ( s ,  s ' )  = d ( s l ,  s )  ; (9.2) 
d ( s ,  s t )  + d ( s P ,  s") l d ( s ,  s") , (9.3) 
Double metrics 
The dis tance between organisms 
The disciplines of comparative anatomy and systematic zoology classify 
creatures into ever-larger s e t s  and sets of sets: individuals (dogs, say), species, 
genera, families, orders,  classes. phyla. taxa. and kingdoms. The classification 
itself forms an algebraic lattice, with individuals acting as t he  system's atoms. 
Comparative anatomists and zoologists bring an exquisitely refined and elaborate 
intuition to  the  task of sorting the  various biological creatures into appropriate 
categories: t h e  obvious cases leap to  t h e  eye; a t  t he  margins of t h e  system, where 
the  whale resides, difficult matters are.  decided by reference to  historical and 
comparative anatomy, parallel structure,  common organization, biological trai ts ,  
and, often, levels of biological achievement. If t he  image of a lattice is for t h e  
moment taken literally, then each level of the lattice, from the atoms upward, 
comprises a set or  ensemble: of individuals. in the  first instance. of sets of indivi- 
duals, in the  second. An ensemble a t  any distinct level of the lattice, I assume, 
satisfies equations (9.1)-(9.3). and counts thus as a metric space. 
Ths distance between s t r i n g s  
DNA is a string drawn from a four-letter alphabet; proteins are strings of 
fixed length composed of 20 amino acids; as such, both strings belong to a wider 
family of string-like objects: computer programs written in a given language, the  
sentences of a natural language. formal systems; and acquire by osmosis a distinct 
conceptual and mathematical structure. It  makes little difference whether strings 
of DNA or strings of amino acids are taken as fundamental; and. in any case. I 
often alternate between the  two. By an alphcrbet A I mean a fixed and finite col- 
lection of elementary entities called mrds; by the u n i v e r s e  of s t r i n g s  over a 
finite alphabet, the set of all finite sequences A* whose elements lie in A .  
The natural distance between words W = wl...w,, V = vl...v, (W, V E A) is 
In] + [nl - 2 x lkl, where k is the maximum of the length of a word U = ul...ul, 
which is a subword both of W and V. For example. let W = cadbabbd. V = xcaaba. 
An appropriate U is U = caab; hence ~ ( w . v  = 8 + 6 - 2 x k .  
Grantham (1974) has proposed a definition of distance in a Euclidean m e t r i c  
space of proteins based on properties of composition. polarity, and volume; but 
the theory of evolution suggests that changes in biological strings come about 
through mutations - random flash points a t  which letters a re  scrambled. Some 
strings may change in a large-hearted way, with whole blocks of letters wheeling 
and shifting like cavalry horses; but the least mechanism to which these opera- 
tions may be resolved is the  simple one of erasure and substitution - deletion and 
insertion. The elementary processes of evolution a t  the molecular level lend to  the  
natural metric a certain simple plausibility in the face of fancy competition. T = 
A * ,  then. is a typogmphic  metric spcrce; dT, its natural distance. 
Metric spaces in phase 
M and P, suppose, are two metric spaces; g :  M -+ M* assigns to  each point p 
in M a distinct point F in W .  M and M* are in phase  under g if g acts roughly 
to preserve distances: for any ( > 0, there exists a 9 > 0, such that  for all p and 
q i n M  
g is thus u n i j o m l y  con t inuous  on M; rp is, of course, a function of .$. It  often 
happens that a particular mapping between metric spaces is especially natural - 
for  reasons that are not mathematical. The English alphabet. for example, makes 
for two metric spaces: strings of letters, sets of words. Strings of letters are 
close if they agree in spelling; words if they agree in meaning. Small typographic 
changes give rise to large differences in meaning: these metric spaces are not in 
phase. This observation is often regarded as a paradox in the context of theoreti- 
cal biology. In an important and influential article, King and Wilson recount evi- 
dence showing that  chimpanzee and human polypeptide sequences are  more than 
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99 percent identical; the  species  appear fur ther  apar t  than a comparative 
analysis of their  polypeptide chains might otherwise suggest.[6] 
Complexity 
Complexity and simplicity, like Yin and Yang, a r e  metaphysical duals; except  
for a vagrant connection to  intuition, i t  hardly makes a difference what is called 
which. Mathematicians and philosophers are interested in complexity for their  
own ends; so are theoretical biologists, who in their  be t t e r  moments a r e  quite 
capable of evincing a sense of Heraclitian awe when confronted with t he  intrica- 
cies of t he  protozoan swim bladder. Simple counting principles often seem as if 
they might provide a general scheme for the,measurement of complexity. Suppose 
tha t  X is a nonempty set of objects and tha t  A ,  B, C, . . . are constructed from the  
elements of X by certain specified operations - concatenation, for example. Can 
w e  not then say tha t  the  complexity C (z )  of any object is a measure of the  number 
of i ts  distinct elements and the  separate and specifiable relations between them? 
C (z )  would be a monotonically increasing function of t he  square of the  number of 
distinct elements in any given construction. Simple, no? And intuitively satisfy- 
ing? 
Apparently not. Label t h e  par t s  of an ordinary watch in an obvious alpha- 
betic fashion; and the  binary relations between i ts  par t s  as well.  The watch when 
working, let  me suppose, has a complexity measured a t  C; but so, then,  does t h e  
watch when not working - when not assembled. in fact ,  binary relations being free 
for t he  asking. Examples of this sor t ,  when extended and made precise, suggest 
ultimately that  any complex object belongs to  an embarrassingly large equivalence 
class of objects precisely equal in point of complexity. 
Statistical mechanical complexity 
A system of identical particles moving within a fixed, bounded, and finite 
volume of space constitutes a configuration; never having seen t h e  blue smoke 
from a cigar spontaneously collect in but one corner of a warm room, the  thought- 
ful physicist - pipe, slippers. Beagle-eyes, an air  of earnest  confusion - concludes 
tha t  not all configurations are equally probable; yet  if there  are N configurations 
Pr(Nc) = Nc / N - this for each i . This incompatibility between what one sees and 
what one gets is known as Boltzmann's paradoz ,  an unhappy name if only because 
no real paradox is forthcoming; but an unhappiness nonetheless. Distinct conf i- 
gurations, Boltzmann argued, may be  grouped into states;  what t h e  altogether 
more elegant Gibbs called ensembles. Within thermodynamics - statistical 
mechanics from above - the  entropy S of a system appears perpetually in t he  
ascendancy and tends inexorably to  a maximum; statistically, Boltzmann reasoned, 
S is thus proportional t o  
S = k  log W ; (9.4) 
where k is Boltzmann's constant, and W a measure of those configurations compati- 
ble with a given s ta te  - complezions as they a re  called in old-fashioned texts .  
Configurations a r e  alike in point of probability: not so complexions; the  probabil- 
i ty of finding a mechanical system in a given s ta te  is proportional t o  t h e  number of 
distinct complexions realizing that state. A t  equilibrium, the complexions are a t  a 
maximum; and so, too, the entropy. which functions as a kind of ectoplasmic mea- 
sure of randomness or  disorder.  
C o m p l d t y  under a classification 
Statistical mechanics has a good point to its credit, and implies a second. 
Certain states of a physical system may be multiply realized; their number, if 
counted, makes for a measure of sorts. What is measured within statistical mechan- 
ics is plainly not complexity; the description of entropy as disorder serves only to 
explain the whole business to the baffled undergraduate. with the explanation 
rapidly withdrawn by the time he enters graduate school. Still. I am struck by the 
extent to which the mathematical definition of entropy is made possible by an 
enterprising reorganization of the way in which mechanical systems are classified; 
in assessing complexity, a concept with a brutish family resemblance to disorder, 
the classification may well  come first. 
An example? Of course. I shall pass glowing colored slides about shortly. Con- 
sider the set of aLl functions f :Rn -. R. Those smooth functions whose critical 
points are nondegenerate are  known as Morse func t ions  and are  a t  once open, 
dense, and locally stable in C"(Rn, R). Any Morse function may be expressed in 
canonical form: if z is a critical point of f , there exists a number k such that  in a 
neighborhood of z , and after a suitable change in coordinates, 
Such is Morse's lemma. Their mathematical docility suggests that the Morse func- 
tions are simple, if anything is; but the Morse functions are simple because they 
are Morse functions, and not Morse functions because they are simple; simplicity 
is a derivative quality, like color, contingent upon a classification. and unremarked 
otherwise. 
The concept of a degenerate singularity makes for a simple classification on 
the space of smooth functions cm(Rn,  R); but a set of objects may be simple under 
a classification even if the classification is itself unpleasantly complex. Writing 
some years ago, Smale asked whether there exists a least Baire se t  U in the space 
of all dynamical systems Dyn(M) on a compact manifold M, whose elements might be 
qualitatively described "by discrete numerical and algebraic invariants".[?] The 
question as posed admitted of a simple answer: no. What is needed, Smale later con- 
cluded, is a sequence of nested subsets UC CDyn(M)l, where k is relatively small. UC 
open, and Uk dense. As i increases. more of Dyn(M) is swallowed; as i decreases, 
stability and regularity properties come to the  fore. It  is for U1 that Axiom A is 
satisfied, nonwandering sets are finite, and the transversality condition is m e t .  Ul 
thus consists of "the simplest. best-behaved, nontrivial class of dynamical sys- 
tems"; but nothing in Smale's organization of Dyn(M) is simple a t  all. 
A set is absolutely simple under a classification if it is a t  once open, dense, 
and locally stable; under this definition simplicity does not come in degrees. 
Often. suitable sets t u n  out to be merely of the  first Baire category, the best one 
can do; sets that a re  dense need not be stable, and vice versa. First category sets 
and sets of measure zero coincide in the case of countable sets; but not beyond. 
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From the  point of view of statistical mechanics, simplicity and complexity a r e  
concepts that  involve configurations; complexity under a classification is a matter 
of routine: what is complex is singular, unusual. These notions may be brought 
into alignment - but only for a certain class of objects. An object A is dissect ive  
only when i t  may be decomposed to a finite stock of par ts  in a finite number of 
steps.  The mammalian eye is a dissective structure;  so is t he  whole of a mouse. a 
moose, or  a mole; but curves and concepts, the  real  numbers, t he  coast of Britain, 
sea-green sea-waves, and, perhaps,  t he  entire bizarre universe of element'ary par- 
ticles, a r e  indissective. A dissective object is thus composed of i ts  par ts  taken 
together under a certain distinctive relationship. Say tha t  A is composed of al, 
az ,  ... ,an under R. By a relational alternative to  R I mean a single permutation of 
t h e  par ts  of A .  If A ,  for example, contains but two par ts ,  a and b ,  say, under the  
relationship R (a, b), R (b , a )  is a relational alternative to  R - t h e  only one in fact. 
Given R ,  I denote by R* t he  full s e t  of all relational alternatives t o  R. If A is 
dissective i t  is R* tha t  forms i ts  complexion class: t he  s e t  of all se t s  of i ts  par t s  
under all and only their  relational alternatives. 
An elementary partition of a complexion class splits t h e  class as a whole into 
equivalence classes; relative to  a partition, complexity and simplicity a r e  a t t r i -  
butes of equivalence classes, and are judged simply by size. To the  ex ten t  tha t  
[Ec] is larger than [E,], i t  is simpler as well; and vice versa. Almost all s t ructures  
in theoretical biology may be  dissected to  a finite. although very large, base; in 
this sense, biological complexity and simplicity have pliant finite measures. 
The mammalian eye, for example, is a dissective structure.  I ts  par ts  (on one 
level of dissection, a t  least) a r e  proteins, which a r e  arranged in various delicate 
and precise ways. I am ignoring, now, any dynamic considerations and thinking 
instead of the  mammalian eye as a static object. The complexion class to  the  mam- 
malian eye consists of all and only those rearrangements of proteins tha t  comprise 
relational alternatives to  the  mammalian eye itself. 
What makes an eye distinctively an eye, r a the r  than some assembly of jelly- 
like proteins, is obviously the  fact  that  i t  is capable of sight. This invocation of 
function sounds an unavoidably Aristotelian note; but without some concept such 
as function o r  purpose, theoretical biology loses much of i ts  point. Let m e  parti- 
tion the  relational alternatives to  t he  mammalian eye into equivalence classes on 
the simple basis of function. In the  full complexion class, those s t ructures  that  
a r e  capable of sight f a l l  t o  one side; and those tha t  a r e  blind and s t a r e  sight- 
lessly, fall to the  other.  Complexity and simplicity appear as matters of relative 
size: the  larger t he  equivalence class, t he  simpler t he  structures.  Given the  deli- 
cacy of the  mammalian eye,  most of i ts  relational alternatives will be  incapable of 
sight; like the  Morse functions, these complexions a r e  simple structures;  but 
again, simple because they a r e  sightless, and not sightless because they a r e  sim- 
ple. 
Complexity in strings 
Of the  2" binary sequences of length n ,  some, such as 
o , o , o , o , o  ,... 
seem simpler than others, 
for example; yet the most natural probability distribution over the  space of n- 
place binary strings assigns to both the same probability: 2-. It goes against t h e  
grain. mine. a t  any rate, to reckon (9.6) as likely as (9.7). especially when n is 
large; but nothing in the  sequences themselves indicates obviously the point of 
distinction. 
The goal of science, Ren4 Thom has suggested. is t o  reduce the  arbitrariness 
of description; substitute data fo r  description. and the apothegm gains my assent. 
A law of nature is data made compact: F = ma, said once and for all. the whole of 
an observed or  observable world compressed into just four symbols. A series of 
observations compactly described is rational; if rational. not random. This curious 
but compelling chain of deductions prompted Kolmogorov to  argue that randomness 
in binary sequences or strings might be measured by the  degree to which such 
strings admit of a simpler description.[8] In following this line, Kolmogorov took 
the first step toward severing information theory from its unwholesome connection 
to the theory of probability. If S is a binary string its length is measured in bits: 
an n-place binary string is n bits long. By a s i m p k r  descr ip t ion  of S, Kolmo- 
gorov meant a string D shorter  than S such that D describes S by acting as the  
input to a fixed computer that generates S. Strings that cannot be compactly 
described are complaz. random, or in .omat ion-r ich;  strings that  can, are not; 
of these adjectives, only the  second preserves even a vagrant connection between 
the  concept that it connotes and what is being measured. This rather inelegant 
idea makes plain the felt difference between a string of n 0s. and a mixed string. 
Sequence (9.6). for example, may be expressed by a program. speaking loosely, 
whose length is log2n + C. If n = 32, log2n = 5 :  the relevant instruction is sim- 
ply to write or compute 0 2' times. C measures what little is needed to carry out 
the instructions; 32 - 5 = 27, the compactness of the program. The shortest pro- 
gram that computes a mixed sequence such as sequence (9.7). by way of contrast. 
may wel l  be close to 32 bits in length: to compute the sequence, the computer must 
f i r s t  store i t  precisely. 
The details? They have been changing since Kolmogorov first spoke, oracle- 
like, on the subject in a note published in 1967; like a snake engulfing an egg, the  
theory of recursive functions is engaged in swallowing algorithmic information 
theory, a development that I deplore, but accept as inevitable. Consider the set of 
all n-place binary strings A* over a binary alphabet A and let  TM be a fixed com- 
puter - a Turing machine. say; g is a general input-output function on ?"M map- 
ping strings onto strings. The complezity of a string S of length n is the Length 
of the shortest binary string D that generates S under TM by means of g .  What- 
ever the complexity of S, D will plainly be maximally complex. and. hence. 
entirely random. Otherwise. i t  would not be the shortest description of S. All fin- 
i te length strings quite obviously have a finite measure of complexity; and only fin- 
itely many distinct strings of the same length have the same finite measure of com- 
plexity. Quite surprisingly. the decision problem for complexity is recursively 
unsolvable; this result follows almost directly from the unsolvability of the halting 
problem for Turing machines. Like truth, randomness is a property that remains 
ineluctably resistant to recursive specification. 
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If all else fails, a binary sequence of length n may be generated by a binary 
sequence of length n: t he re  a r e  2" such algorithms, and 2" - 2 algorithms 
shor te r  than this. On any reasonable interpretation of complexity, algorithms 
within a fixed integer k of n itself must be  reckoned random o r  complex or  nearly 
so. Thus 2n -k -1 - 2 /  2n algorithms have a complexity less than n - k ; and are 
hence nonrandom o r  simple. If k = 10, this ratio is roughly 1 in 1000; of 1000 
binary sequences of length n ,  only one can be compressed into a program more 
than ten bits shor te r  than itself. Hence: 
Theorem 9.1 The se t  of random sequences of length n in t he  space A* of all 
binary sequences of length n is generic in A * .  
These random sequences a r e  simple under a classification because they a r e  typi- 
cal, but complex in a stronger and more absolute sense because they a r e  random 
or  information-rich. In this context, genericity is a finite measure of size. The 
number of purely random strings grows exponentially with n , of course. If most 
binary sequences a r e  random, t h e  appearance of sequence (9.6) prompts a natural 
stochastic surprise: sequences such as (9.7) a r e  what one expects. The definition 
of Kolmogorov complexity may be directly extended to  recursively enumerable 
sets;  se t s  of strings especially, and hence languages. 
Language-like Systems 
When i t  comes to  language, t he re  is syntax and semantics. Phonetics is t h e  
province of t h e  specialist; pragmatics remains a pale albino dwarf. To semantics 
belongs t h e  concept of meaning; t o  syntax, t h e  concept of a well-formed formula or 
a grammatical sentence. The reference to  logic is happy if only because i t  
highlights t he  fact  t ha t  language-like systems go beyond t h e  natural languages. 
Any language no doubt exists primarily to convey meaning; but meaning in 
mathematics is a matter of a model - an extrinsic object. 
The construction of strings within a language-like system involves con- 
catenating or  associating simpler strings: any finite string may be  dissected to  a 
finite s e t  of least elements. Going up, concatenation; going down, finite dissection; 
retrograde motion of this sor t  suggests tha t  language-like systems on this level be  
represented algebraically as semigroups. Let A b e  any nonempty s e t  of objects - 
words, for example, o r  le t ters ,  o r  numbers. A has t h e  s t ructure  of a semigroup if 
t he re  exists a mapping A x A + A such that  for alI a ,  6, and c in A 
In English words go over t o  sentences from left t o  right; in Hebrew, from right to  
left; but in any case, one s t ep  a t  a time. Let A be  a finite s e t  of words now, with 
words understood implicitly as t h e  least elements of a natural language; and let A* 
be  the  s e t  of all finite sequences ( a  l,..., an)  whose elements lai, ..., an j lie in A .  
To endow A* with t h e  s t ructure  of a semigroup, i t  suffices to  define an associative 
mapping A* x A* -r A* : easy enough. If 
and 
then 
where 
A* is a t  once a free-semigroup over a finite alphabet and a u n i v e r s a l  Language: 
no sequences are left out. 
Almost all language-like systems are large in the sense that they have many 
distinct strings. Meditating on the matter in the late 1950s. and regularly 
thereafter. Noam Chomsky argued that every natural language is infinite by virtue 
of its recursive mechanisms - conjunction and alternation. for example - and. 
simultaneously, that such mechanisms are recursive by virtue of the fact that 
every natural language is infinite. Both halves to this argument. taken together, 
describe a closed circle in space. Whatever the truth, language-like systems. if 
they are infinite, are countably infinite and no bigger.[9] 
Going further toward a definition of a language-like system involves the bad- 
lands beyond triviality. Linguistics, the French linguist Maurice Gross once provo- 
catively remarked, admits of but a single class of crucial experiments. Native 
speakers of a given language are  able to determine whether a given sentence is 
grammatical. Experiments of this sort exist because no language-like system 
encompasses the whole of a set  of strings drawn on a finite alphabet - a curious 
and interesting jbct. which the sheer concept of communication might otherwise 
not suggest. The distinction between grammatical and ungrammatical strings 
induces a primitive classification on a language-Like system; and reflects an even 
stronger principle of fastidiousness: the vast majority of language-like strings are  
not grammatical at  all and represent syntactic gibberish. The fastidiousness of 
Language-Like systems is yet again a fact: it would be  easy. if unrewarding, to 
design an artificial language in which most strings were grammatical. From the 
point of view of grammar, the strings of a natural language are complex under the 
classification of strings into grammatical and ungmmmatical sets. With the strings 
arrayed in front of the mind's bleak and rheumy eye, in ascending order, by 
length, with sets of strings stacked like an inverted pyramid, the grammatical 
strings in a language-like system appear as nothing more than a thin smudge; they 
are thus complex under this classification because they are  singular, unusual. 
The origins of this bit of natural history are to be discovered, no doubt, in the 
algorithmic properties of the human brain: in order to store a natural language. 
the brain must first represent i t  - in the form of recursive rules, for example. 
This suggests that language-like systems are low in point of Kolmogorov complex- 
ity; and from this point of view, s imple .  
A natural language, I have already observed, realizes two metric spaces (cf. p 
240): but the informal example that I gave involved the concept of meaning, and 
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not grammar. No matter: t h e  point carries over to  t h e  case a t  hand - and 
comprises t he  thi rd  of t h r ee  queer natural facts  tha t  nothing in t h e  concepts of 
grammar o r  communication obviously implies. Thus, le t  T be  a typographic metric 
space of strings under t h e  natural metric; t he  same se t  of strings comprises a 
second metric space under t h e  degenerate distance function d * :  if s and s' are 
both grammatical, d*  (s  , s') = 0 ;  if not, d* ( s  , sf) = m. These are t h e  natural and 
(degenerate) g rammat ica l  metric spaces of a language-like system. In a language- 
like system, natural and grammatical metric spaces a r e  plainly n o t  in phase. 
Two models of generation 
Linguistics is a rebarbative, hair  shir t  of a subject; and grammar a vexing 
property.  Linguists, fo r  reasons of their  own, a r e  often interested in t h e  weakest 
of generative devices tha t  specify all and only t h e  sentences of a natural 
language. 
Represen ta t ion  by g r a m m a r  
A p h r a s e  s t r u c t u r e  g r a m m a r  is a quadruple G = (A, T ,  S, P), where A is 
some finite alphabet of symbols; T, a distinguished subset  of A - t h e  s e t  of so- 
called terminal symbols; S, a distinguished initial symbol; and P, a finite s e t  of 
production rules of t he  form u + v ;  u is a nonempty s e t  of nonterminal symbols, 
and v  some specified str ing of characters.  The se t  of all strings of terminal sym- 
bols constitutes a p h r a s e  s t r u c t u r e  l a n g u a g e  - a proper  subset  of t h e  s e t  of all 
strings A* defined over A . 
By a context-pee production rule. I mean one in which u may occur in any 
context - in effect, a rule in which u figures in isolation. Correspondingly, t he re  
a r e  context-free grammars. 
Example 9 .1Le t  A = ( a , b ) , T  = ( a , b ) ,  and P be  the  two rules S + a b ;  S + US. 
This grammar generates all and only t he  strings of t he  form a n  b ". 
Represen ta t ion  by systems of equa t ions  
Consider t he  context-free grammar G whose production rules are S + &a, 
and S + c , where T = ( a ,  c ), and S is an initial symbol. Let t he  variable f range 
over terminal symbols. The action of t he  production rules may be mimicked by an 
equation: 
where addition is construed as  s e t  theoretic union. For G , 
Replacing S by SO = c , 
s(') = a c a  + c . 
D. Berltnskt 
This process repeated ultimately yields a system of equations 
t =n 
s ( ~ )  = a n c a n  + - .  + aca + c = C a t c a i  . 
t =m 
A t  the Limit, the solution s(-)  )= C a f c a '  is given by a formal power series in 
t * 
noncommutative variables. [lo] 
A language-like system has f irmal  suppor t  when each and every string in 
the system may be described by a single algorithm; only for context-free 
languages may grammars and systems of equations be balanced against each other. 
~ l sewhere ,  the situation is darker. There is a sense, however, in which these two 
representations exhaust the possibilities for the description of structured and 
infinitary objects; and correspond. in the Metaphysical Large, to the alternatives 
confronting an imaginary Deity in creating the observable world. 
Weak Theories 
The vitalist believes that  life cannot be explained in terms of physics or  
chemistry. In the nineteenth century, in Germany and France, a t  least, his was 
the dominant voice before Darwin; and natural philosophers. such as Cuivier or  
von Baer, or  Geoffrey St. Hilaire, dismissed mechanism with a kind of troubled 
confidence that suggests. in retrospect, a combination of assurance and wistful- 
ness. Orthodoxies have subsequently reversed themselves with no real gain in 
credibility. David Hull,  in surveying this issue. concludes that neither mechanism 
nor vitalism is plausible, given the uninspiring precision with which each position 
is usually cast.[ll] D'dccord. To the extent that the refutation of vitalism involves 
the reduction of biological to physical reasoning, the effort involved appears to 
m e  misguided. and reflects a discreditable, almost oriental, desire for the Unity of 
Opposites. On the standard view of reduction, the sciences collapse downward 
until they hit physics: Rez-da-Chausee; but our intellectual experience is 
divided: mathematics. physics, biology, the social sciences. Each science extends 
sideways for some time and then simply stops. The ardent empiricist, surveying 
the  contemporary scene, might w e l l  incline to scientific polytheism, with 
mathematics under the influence of an austere Artin-like figure, and biology 
directed by a God much like Wotan: furious, bluff. subtle, devious, and illiterate. 
Still, the philosopher of science is bound to wonder why so many philose 
phers have remained partial to the reductionist vision, and hence to mechanistic 
thought in biology. David Armstrong. J.J.C. Smart, Michael Ruse, and even the usu- 
ally cagey W.v.0. Quine, call on elegance to explain their attachment. Were the sci- 
ences irreducibly striated, one set of laws would cover physics, another biology, 
and still a third, economics and urban affairs, with the whole business resembling 
nothing so much as a parfait in several lurid and violently clashing colors. This is 
an aesthetic argument, and none the worse for that, but surely none the bet ter  
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either. If elegance is inadequate as a motive, intellectual anxiety, realized uncons- 
ciously, is not. 
Vitalism commences from the conviction that nothing in our experience is 
much like the life that ripples and bubbles so abundantly over an entire planet, 
and nowhere else, apparently. Now mathematical physics is not only the pre- 
eminent discipline of our time - i t  is where the laws are. Evolutionary theories in 
biology a re  weak in the sense that they are not directly sustained by the author- 
ity of physics; and, worse, weaker still in being counterph ysical .  Thermodynamic 
arguments count against the very existence of the structures that they are  meant 
to explain. Fact heavy, law poor, such theories remain surprisingly resistant to 
confirmation. Were biology an aspect merely of physics, the sceptic would get 
short shrift: there,  the answer to whether what works, works, is simply that i t  
does. 
Science is unavoidably general. To say that copper conducts electricity is 
weakly to imply the counterfactual conditional that were anything much like 
copper i t  would conduct electricity as well. I t  has often appeared to philosophers 
of science that specifying what i t  means for something - an z ,  say - to be much 
like copper inevitably comes to claiming that, among other things, z conducts 
electricity. Still, the similarity in structure between two domains of discourse - 
computer prokpms and natural languages, for example - may be obvious on 
grounds other than the fact that  they share the same laws. 
When I speak of a theory, I follow the logician's lead: a theory consists of a 
consistent set of sentences in a given language; the set-theoretic or  algebraic 
structures in which a theory is satisfied comprise its models. Two models that  
share the same structure are  isomorphic and hence elementarily equivalent in the 
sense that  they satisfy the  same sets of sentences. What I am after  is a weaker 
notion entirely - partial similarity in structure. I know of no way, unfortunately, 
to define this concept so that the  definition applies equably to biology, and, say, 
geology; I suspect, in fact, that partial similarity in structure will require a defini- 
tion with indefinitely many separate clauses. Whatever the details, similarity in 
structure is bound to be a matter of degree, so that i t  makes sense of sorts to say 
of two models that  they are a t  a certain distance, one from the other. In this way 
a family Mt I, i = 1.2,. . . of (possibly) f i r s t ~ r d e r  models may be given an appropri- 
a te  and empirical metric structure. 
Suppose that T is a theory holding in M; and let AP be a model a t  some fixed 
distance from M .  By the symmetric d i f f e ~ e n c e  T/ F of T I mean the number of 
formulas P of T that  fail to  hold in M* when T is interpreted in M*. 
A theory T is general, I shall say, if for any E > 0 ,  there exists a 6 > 0 (a 
function of e, of course) such that  
Generality in my sense is a kind of stability; and as D r  Johnson remarks, the 
soul must ultimately repose in the stability of the truth. 
To see an analogy between the operations of life, on the one hand, and the 
operations of language, on the other, is to raise the question whether the  laws of 
biology have a natural and legitimate interpretation in linguistic terms. I am myself 
indifferent to the fate of the Darwinian theory, and perfectly prepared to 
believe, along with Wickramasinghe and the luckless Hoyle, that life originated in 
outer space. or  that the  Universe-as-a-Whole is alive and breathing stertorously; 
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but if Darwinian theories work in life, they should work elsewhere - in language- 
like systems, I should think. Should they fail there,  this may be taken as evidence 
for  the inadequacy of Darwinian theories, or  as evidence for the inadequacy of t h e  
analogy that  prompted the  comparison in the  first  place. 
I stress this point if only because i t  has so often been misunderstood. 
Life as a language-Like system 
It w a s  von Neumann who gave to the idea that life is Like language a part  of i t s  
curious current cachet. The last years of his life he devoted to a vast and clumsy 
orchestration of cellular automata. showing in a partial fashion that when properly 
programmed they could, like abstract elephants, reproduce themselves. Some 
years before. McCulloch and Pitts had constructed a series of neural nets in order 
to simulate simple reflex action; Kleene demonstrated that their nets had t h e  
power of finite automata and were capable of realizing the  class of regular events; 
von Neumann's automata had the fu l l  power of Turing machines. Michael Arbib, E.F. 
Codd. G.T. Herman, A. Lindenmayer, and many others, have carried this work for- 
ward. with results that asymptotically approach u t ter  irrelevance.[lZ] Yet the  
analogy between living systems and Living languages has not lost any of its brassy 
charm. There is information, of course, which is apparently what the genes store; 
replication. coding; messages abound in the bacterial cell. with E. Coli .  in particu- 
lar, busy as a telephone switchboard. So striking has the appropriation of termi- 
nology become, that some biologists now see the processes of life. in all their gran- 
deur, as the effort of a badly protected and vulnerable bit of genetic material to  
keep taking for all eternity. 
UnIike an argument. an analogy stands or  falls in point of plausibility; good 
arguments in favor of bad analogies are infinitely less persuasive than bad argu- 
ments in favor of good analogies. Certainly the proteins. to stick with one class of 
chemicals. may be decomposed to a finite base - the 20 amino acids. The precise, 
delicate, dance-Like steps that are involved in their formation suggest, moreover, 
that they satisfy some operation as abstract as concatenation. On the other hand, 
the number of possible proteins, although large, is finite; but one of the joys of 
analogical reasoning is the vagueness with which the line between success o r  
failure may be drawn. 
The grammatical strings of a language-like system are  low in Kohogorov com- 
plexity, and so are not random. Such is the fastidiousness of a language-like sys- 
tem. What of the proteins? If they are random, i t  makes Little sense to think of 
them as biological words or sentences. Jacques Monod, whose metaphysical attitude 
toward biology suggested nothing so much as a kind of chirpy bleakness, drew 
attention to the random character of the proteins in La husard  et la necessite; 
his argument has been gravely accepted by many molecular biologists.[l3] In fact, 
the evidence leading to his conclusion is fragmentary; the standards of random- 
ness to which he appealed, imprecise. Thus it struck Monod that knowing, say, 249 
amino acid residues in a chain 250 residues in length, one could yet not predict 
the last member of the chain; much the same is true for English sentences, of 
course; i t  is, in any case, simply untrue that protein strands exhibit such wanton 
degrees of freedom. Within protein chemistry, there are many instances of what 
appear to be strong internal regularities: palindromic patterns, for example. 
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Nonetheless, I am in sympathy with Monod to  this extent :  i t  is unlikely tha t  the  
analogy between life and language will be profitably pursued on the  atomistic level 
of the  nucleic acids o r  t he  proteins themselves. 
PART THREE 
Arguments Good and Bad 
The theory of evolution is haunted by an image and an observation: t he  first ,  
that  of the  hapless chimpanzee, typewriter-bound, endeavoring, quite by chance, 
t o  s t r ike  off t h e  f i rs t  twenty lines of Hamlet's soliloquy; t h e  second, t he  comment 
of an anonymous Jansenist logician, who remarked, quite sensibly, "that i t  would 
be sheer  folly to  be t  even ten coppers against 10000 gold pieces tha t  a child 
arranging a t  random a printer 's  supply of le t ters  would compose t h e  f i rs t  twenty 
lines of Virgd's Ansicill.  Image and observation do not quite cohere into a single 
argument: i t  is clear in neither case how t he  imagined stochastic experiment is to  
stop. Still, the  notion of randomness yet  lies a t  the  cen te r  of evolutionary 
thought, and there  i t  sits, toad-like and croaking. On t h e  simplest and most intui- 
tive conception of probability, what can occur is weighted against the  background 
of what might occur: five diamonds: all o ther  combinations of t he  cards. In poker, 
there  a r e  2 598 960 five-card hands, but only 5 148 flushes. I t  is their  ratio tha t  
one might expect  t o  observe as  cards are actually dealt; but in t he  longest of long 
runs, the  passage to  the  limit gives content t o  t he  intuitive idea tha t  a number of 
successive trials will converge to  a particular real number: 0.002, for example, if 
flushes a r e  being counted. 
One of the  curiosities of t he  very notion of probability is t he  inescapability 
of t he  improbable. The laws of thermodynamics, t o  take a notorious example, a r e  
anisotropic: they go in one direction; downhill, as i t  happens, a circumstance with 
what appears t o  be  overwhelming personal support. Statistical mechanics provides 
a brilliant and persuasive explanation for thermodynamic laws; yet PoincarC 
demonstrated, in an absurdly easy proof, tha t  any statistical mechanical confi- 
guration, of whatever degree of implausibility - k molecules of gas, for example, 
occupying 1/V of t h e  total volume V of a finite and bounded container - is bound 
to  recur ,  in all i ts  vividness, poignant symmetry, and complexity, given enough 
time. Physicists often explain t he  discrepancy between thermodynamics and sta- 
tistical mechanics by arguing tha t  the  time involved is very long. No doubt. 
The evolution of life on this planet is, as Darwin realized. not a hurried 
affair. Early on, Darwinian biologists got rid of t he  theological limits set t o  t he  age 
of the  Earth by Bishop Ussher and others in t he  seventeenth century; t he  scale 
within which Darwinian evolution might have worked is bounded by perhaps five 
billion years. Nineteenth century biologists assumed tha t  whatever else one might 
say about Darwinian biology, i t  would not fail for lack of time; this thesis twentieth 
century biologists have carried over intact. 
Five billion years is ap t  to  seem long if one is counting the  minutes; but i t  is 
not long enough to  sample on a point by point basis a space whose cardinality is 
roughly 1015 - touching base with a new point a t  every second, say; and yet  there  
a r e  20'~' possible proteins - a number larger by f a r  than t h e  expected life of the  
22 D. Berlinski 
universe measured in seconds. In a space of this size. the odds against discover- 
ing a specific protein - fishing it  from an urn, say - are prohibitive: 1 in 2 0 ~ .  
I spoke hastily just now of a speci* protein: if a n y  protein will do, the odds 
improve: in a uniform probability space (ai 1 ,  Pr(al v a2 . . . v a i )  =I. The dis- 
tinguished British biologist Peter Medawar  has seized upon this point, and com- 
menced happily to trot,  but in what I think is the wrong direction.[l4] "Biolo- 
gists," he  writes. "in certain moods are apt  to say that  organisms are madly 
improbable objects or that evolution is a device for generating high degrees of 
improbability. I am uneasy about this entire line of thought," he continues, "for 
the following reason: 
Everyone will concede that in the games of whist or bridge any one particular 
hand is just as unlikely to turn up as any other. If I pick up and inspect a par- 
ticular hand and then declare myself utterly amazed that such a hand should 
have been dealt to me, considering the fantastic odds against it, I should be 
told by those who have steeped themselves in mathematical reasoning that its 
probability cannot be measured retrospectively, but only against a prior 
expectation ... For much the same reason, it seems to m e  profitless to speak 
of natural selection's 'generating improbability' ... it is silly to be thunder- 
struck by the evolution of organ A if w e  should have been just as thunder- 
struck by a turn of events that had led to the evolution of B or  C instead." 
Medawar is roughly right about probability: the fallacy to which he refers is 
the e r r o r  of retrospective speci jka t ion;  and consists precisely in reading back 
into an original sample space information revealed only on the realization of a par- 
ticular event. In poker, a deal distributes n hands of equal probability: 1 in 
2 598 960, as i t  happens. This sample space is retrospectively specified if one hand 
in particular is contrasted with the  full set of 2598 959 hands that remain. and 
probabilities assigned to the partition so created; what appears initially as one 
among equiprobable events becomes under retrospective specification an improb- 
able event in a sample space of only two points. It is embarrassing for an author to 
point such things out. Still. Medawar is wrong in the general conclusions that he 
draws from this paragraph. Card sharps and statisticians are little interested in 
the set of all five-card sequences. In poker, sequences are i n i t i a l l y  partitioned 
into equivalence classes of uneven size: a royal straight flush, of which there are 
four, a straight flush, four of a kind. a full house, a straight, three of a kind. two 
pairs, and, then, finally, whatever is left - the vast majority. There are four ways 
to achieve a royal straight flush; many more ways in which to realize a full house. 
Since they are specified in advance, partitions in poker carry no taint of retro- 
spection; and plainly, in poker there is only a rough correlation between the 
internal character of sequences within a partition and their payoffs: what is 
important here, as elsewhere, is the classification, which is very largely arbi- 
trary. 
Medawar's argument, on its face, thus involves rather an uninspiring mistake, 
but i t  is not yet a mistake in evolutionary thought. The human eye, a chastened 
M e d a w a r  might argue, turning his back on his own analogy between life and the  
cards, represents one arrangement of its constituents: any other might have done 
as well. In admiring the  structure that  results, w e  suffer from misplaced awe, like 
a toad contemplating a dog. Does this argument carry conviction eye-wise? Is i t  
reasonable to suppose that any other arrangement of the eye's constituents would 
result in an eye? In anything a t  all? The question sounds an unavoidably Aristo- 
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telian note: an eye is an organ with a specific function - sight, most obviously; an 
eye-like configuration does not count as an eye unless i t  can see. To frame the 
discussion thus is to answer the question immediately, a t  least on the level of 
intuition; but what I have said must not be confused with an a rgument  in refuta- 
tion. 
Viable proteins 
Linguistics is possible if only because human beings have strong and reliable 
intuitions about natural languages. The polypeptides are alien strings, accessible 
only through an arduous act  of the biochemical imagination. Grammar effects a 
segregation of strings in a language-like system; beyond grammar, aloof, untouch- 
able, there is meaning; the two concepts do not coincide. Some grammatical 
strings, in a natural language, a t  least, a re  grammatical and meaningless; others, 
meaningful but ungrammatical; but meaning and grammar belong together, yoked 
pairs in the same corner of some dimly understood conceptual space. An algebraic 
system of strings in which no distinctions of meaning and grammar a re  recognized 
is profligate; and pointless because of its profligacy. 
In a preanalytic sense, the  concept of meaning indicates a kind of coherence; 
and has a usefulness of application in domains other than language. A life well- 
spent is meaningful: its parts and patterns are  ordered; full with life, biological 
creatures are  filled with meaning, a kind of blunt, irrefrangible purpose; in death, 
this meaning disappears, and what is left, the  corpse and its grim constituents, 
appears all a t  once to lose the integrity of the creature itself, and becomes, 
instead, a thing among other things, an object merely. To the  vitalist, living 
creatures instantiate some unique property that remains stubbornly unseen else- 
where - in the domain of objects studied by mathematical physics, for example; in 
death, this property vanishes, like a fluid evaporating. In mechanistic thought, 
the passage from life to death is rather  like a phase transition, a singularity of 
sorts in the trajectory of the organism. a disabling and permanent catastrophe, 
that reflects, as it must. only a change in the constituents of the organism, a vari- 
ation in its underlying pattern. The concept of a complexion. which 
figures in statistical mechanics, provides a useful measure of meaning. The com- 
plexion set  to a biological organism represents those relational alternatives of its 
biological parts that correspond to living systems. The unalterable fact that living 
systems die and hence do not persist indicates that some of their complexions fail 
to preserve life and hence meaning; in fact, the number of meaningless complex- 
ions must be significant: most of the arbitrary rearrangements of a complex organ 
- a mammal, say - result in nothing more than a botch - a circumstance with 
which every surgeon is familiar. The Central Dogma of molecular biology estab- 
lishes a relationship between strings of nucleotides and strings of proteins; to the 
extent that the whole of a biological organism may be resolved into its protein-like 
parts,  the Central Dogma establishes a larger, more indirect, relationship be tween 
molecular biological order and order in the larger sense of Life. This relationship 
has an inverse: if only certain forms of life have meaning, this, too, is reflected, as 
i t  must be, in the universe of molecular biological strings - on the  level of string 
ensembles, for example. If certain protein ensembles are  meaningful, and not oth- 
ers, this suggests, but does not imply, that the same distinction is palpable on the 
level of the individual proteins themselves. The t e r m  viable I mean as a biological 
coordinate to the Siamese concepts of meaning and grammar; a protein is viable 
only when it  achieves a certain minimum level of biological organization and useful- 
ness. What level? What kind of organization? Usefulness in what respect and to 
what degree? Who knows? 
F U L L  loads, fair loads, jhir samples  
In a natural language. sentences decompose to words; words to letters. Gram- 
matical constraints hold weakly a t  the level of English words. The set of all word- 
like combinations of English letters of fixed length n. I shall say, make up a f i l l  
load; the  set of a l l  grammatical words, a jhir load. Within molecular biology. a f u l l  
load corresponds to all possible proteins of normal length: a se t  whose cardinality 
is 2 0 ~ ~ .  TO the f a i r  loads in English correspond the viable proteins in molecular 
biology. How large is the biological fair load? Again. who knows? Whatever its ulti- 
mate size, those proteins that have already been synthesized in the  course of bio- 
logical history are viable if anything is: nothing succeeds Like success. This se t  is 
a fair sample of a f a i r  load. Its size Murray Eden calculates a t  2 0 ~ ~ .  The task 
that he sets himself is the infinitely delicate one of drawing inferences about the 
f a i r  load from its f a i r  sample. [I51 
Between the f a i r  sample of a f a i r  load. and the f a i r  load itself. is the differ- 
ence between what is and what might be; between the f a i r  load and the full load. 
the difference between biology and mathematics. In English, the difference 
between the f a i r  load and the full load is as absolute as death. Any two words of 
English thus resemble each other more than they are Likely to resemble a word 
generated a t  random from the letters of the English alphabet. In the case of the 
polypeptides. Murray Eden writes: 
Two hypotheses suggest themselves. Either functionally useful proteins are  
very common to this space. so that almost any polypeptide one is likely to find 
has a useful function to perform. or  else the topology appropriate to this 
protein space is an important feature of the exploration: that is. there exists 
certain strong regularities for finding paths through this space. 
In asking whether'the viable proteins are common in the  space of all polypep- 
tides, Eden is asking, in effect, whether the f a i r  sample is marked by discernable 
statistical regularities. "We cannot now discard the first  hypothesis. " he adds. 
"but there  is certain evidence which seems to be against it: if all polypeptide 
chains were useful proteins, w e  would expect that existing proteins would exhibit 
very different distributions of amino acids." Statistical tests appear to show that 
pairs of proteins are drawn from a common stock. H i s  example involves the alpha 
and beta human hemoglobin chain. One form of hemoglobin has 146 amino acid resi- 
dues, the other 140. The two chains may be set  down, side by side, and matched. 
residue by residue. They agree a t  61  points: there are 76 points at  which they 
differ, and 9 points a t  which no match is possible because the chains a re  not of 
the same length. It is plausible that one chain was derived from the other. or  that  
both were derived from a common ancestor. What is curious about these pairs of 
proteins, however, is the fact that  even though the chains do not agree completely 
in the order of their amino acids, they do agree in their dis t r ibut ion;  reason 
enough, Eden argues, to suppose that the proteins themselves are drawn from a 
statistically significant fair sample. 
The criticism of this historically important argument. I leave as an exercise. 
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Delicate inferences 
In What is Life?, Schroedinger argued tha t  living systems must have 
recourse to  what he  dubbed an "aperiodic crystal" in order  to  s tore  information. 
Crystals a r e  repetitive, regular, and information poor; t he  order  of a living system 
is specific, irregular, information rich. There is a certain splendid effulgence to  
the  vocabulary of theoretical biology tha t  i t  would be  uncharitable not to  cherish. 
H.P. Yockey identifies order  with Kolmogorov complexity; and so does R.M. Thomp- 
son, a mathematician who in writing on theoretical biology alternates between 
information theory and a pious endeavor to  communicate to  t he  reader  his appre- 
ciation for  t he  many faces of Krishna.[l6] On the  o ther  hand, G.J. Chaitin and 
R.M. Bennett identify biological order  with algorithmic simplicity. A division of 
intuition on so fundamental a point may suggest a degree of conceptual confusion 
approaching t h e  schizophrenic. 
If biological words are characterized by a high degree of Kolmogorov com- 
plexity, could time and chance have combined to  discover a s t ructure  comparable, 
say, to  cytochrome c or  any of t he  modern hemoglobin chains? This is t he  ques- 
tion raised by the  redoubtable H.P. Yockey: the  problem as posed has but two 
parameters.[l?] In t he  beginning the  primeval soup, which I always imagine as 
r a the r  a viscous, Borscht-like fluid, contained perhaps amino acid molecules. 
There is, inevitably, an element of fantasy to  all quantitative calculations of this 
sort. A t  each second, over t h e  course of 1 X 10' years, an indefatigable stochastic 
Deity arranges and then rearranges the  amino acid residues in sequences 
whose length N = 101. There a r e  
such sequences. The odds against discovering any one in particular thus stand a t  1 
in 2.535 x 10131. Not all residues. however, are equally probable. Save for a very 
large se t  of strings of small probability, the  number of sequences of length N is 
where 
Here pj measures t he  probability of the  j t h  residue, and a = 2, so tha t  H is 
measured in bits. 
In t h e  end - t he  details a r e  not important to  my argument - Yockey con- 
cludes tha t  
H = 4.153 bits/ residue ; (9.12) 
the  number of 101 place sequences is 
"Information theory," he  remarks, "shows that ,  in this case, t he  actual number of 
sequences is smaller than the  total possible number by a factor of lo5". Now there  
a re ,  in all. 3.8 x lo6' families of cytochrome c sequences; in order  t o  obtain any 
one of them by chance, Yockey argues, i t  would be  necessary to repeat  an elemen- 
ta ry  stochastic experiment 3.15 x times on l o 8  separate planets "in order  to  
have a reasonable expectation of selecting a t  least once a member of the ensemble 
of 3.8 x cytochrome c sequences in only ten of them". 
From nothing, nothing, the Darwinian doubters have always claimed; and I 
have been there with the  best of them; but this argument, couched as i t  is largely 
within the algorithmic theory of complexity stands on what seems to me dubious 
ground: 
(1) A binary string is random to the extent that its shortest program is roughly 
of the same length as the  string itself; this definition trades only in counting 
bits. Now, the impulse to assert  that contemporary proteins are random owes 
much. I think, to the ra ther  primitive idea that life, if complex, requires com- 
plex constituents or atoms; I have suggested something similar in arguing that 
the proteins inherit a grammatical distinction from the  structures that they 
constitute. Kolmogorov complexity, however, is ill-defined on any level of bio- 
logical organization past the  molecular; but even if a mammal or a mollusk 
could be represented as a binary string, nothing suggests that  those strings 
would be high in Kolmogorov complexity. Quite the contrary. Life in the large. 
on the level of the organism itself, is organized with what appears to be brisk 
algorithmic efficiency. Living creatures are simple in the  sense of Kolmogorov 
complexity; but complex under the  classification of their complexions. In this 
sense, they behave much as a language-like system. This observation is com- 
patible with the thesis that  protein strings are, nonetheless. high in Koho- 
gorov complexity; but i t  is compatible, too, with the  contrary thesis that pro- 
tein strings reflect the  complexity of life by means of their organization 
and not their complexity. Nothing in the concept of Kolmogorov complexity 
measures the algorithmic organization of a string or  set  of strings; two 
equally complex strings may wel l  differ in their time complezity to the  
extent that only one is polynomially bounded. 
(2) The difference between the  space of available proteins. and the small subset 
actually chosen by evolution, makes for a trite contrast; yet what lends to 
cytochrome c its position of statistical distinction? "Because of the very fun- 
damental function of the cytochromes." Yockey writes. " ... the  histones and 
other proteins, which are believed to be of very ancient and even pre- 
cellular origin, one cannot relax the  specif ic i ty  requirement derived from 
cytochrome c" [emphasis added]. In generous conversation. Yockey has ampli- 
fied this point by suggesting that the specific protein chains necessary for 
life correspond to the  se t  of words in a language - fair and not full loads; a 
curious remark inasmuch as words in a natural language are low, and not high, 
in Kolmogorov complexity. Still. I am sympathetic to the  drift  of this Line; but 
the difficulty goes beyond the problems of an imperfect analogy. Certain 
classes of proteins, Yockey argues. are necessary for life. Such are the  
information-rich, complex strands; other strands are  specific in the limited 
sense that they are statistically unlikely: "only a tiny fraction of the (avail- 
able) sequences will carry specificity." I t  follows by Theorem 9.1 (p 245) 
that specificity and complexity are  not the same thing: the set of complex 
strands (of a given length) is in the majority; their emergence is probabilisti- 
cally favorable. indeed, unavoidable. C ytochrome c ,  considered simply as a 
complex protein. is no more likely to appear than any other complex protein: 
but no less likely either. Having discovered cytochrome c ,  quite by chance, 
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Life might have made do with any other protein of comparable complexity. If 
by specificity, Yockey means statistical unlikelihood in a uniform sample 
space - the space of all complex proteins, for example - his surprise a t  the 
emergence of cytochrome c is attributable to retrospective specification; if 
not, what then is specificity, the mysterious middle term to his argument? If 
the specific proteins have some independent description, Yockey does not 
provide it; and their size, apart from suggesting that i t  is low, he does not 
calculate. 
Der Prozess 
The evidence in favor of the thesis that proteins are  random sequences of 
amino acids is exiguous; and random words may well be grouped into nonrandom 
sequences. This suggests that the close study of the statistical properties of cer- 
tain proteins may involve a kind of dense conceptual myopia, something that 
reflects a passionate absorption in minutiae. The process by which evolution in 
strings takes place, on the other hand, is macroscopic and global, an energetic 
probabilistic swarming over sample spaces that a re  never specified by means of 
mechanisms that a re  never clarified. 
Biological paths 
Life loiters over two metric spaces. The first is alphabetic; the second, zoo- 
logical. Evolution comprises a drama in the large, a t  the zoological level; but the 
Central Dogma requires that any change in the large be mirrored by an alphabetic 
change, and so the process is doubled as i t  is divided. To talk blithely of evolution 
in strings is to assume the completion of the two first steps in biological evolution: 
the emergence of life-like systems from inorganic matter; and the adventitious 
creation of the modern biological system of replication and genetic information. An 
explanation of these steps I cede to the forces of the Night: my more limited con- 
cern is with evolution as a process that takes place once the genetic machinery is 
throbbing moistly. In evolution a t  the molecular level, one amino acid is dropped 
from a protein string, another is inserted: make way! ,  move over!,  get out!,  get 
Lost!, to cast the operations in easily understood t e rms;  even if the process is 
more complicated, i t  may mathematically be resolved into discrete and finite 
steps. Whatever the details, proteins change over time; and the changes leading 
to their creation may be regarded as a p a t h  P = p l , p z ,  ..., pn or protein 
sequence.  Suppose that A  comprises the full stock of 20 amino acids; A / ,  the set 
of all words  of amino acids precisely 250 points in length; and A * ,  the set  of all 
finite sequences drawn over A / .  I assume - an a s s u m p t i o n  note! - that A* has 
the structure of a language-like system under the binary and associative operation 
of protein concatenat ion.  where concatenation has precisely its usual linguistic 
meaning. 
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Stochastic processes 
Let S be a system and X the set of its states or  configurations. State transi- 
tions are represented by a transformation T :  X + X ,  an artifice expressing t h e  
action of the system's laws of evolution. If Ts+c = T s T t ,  [Tt ER] is a flow, o r  
g r o u p  action of R on X. 
On the  Darwinian theory, evolution is a t  its secret  heart  stochastic; it is 
natural, therefore, to specialize the  concept of a process to the case in which X is 
a measure space, T a measure preserving transformation. This is the domain 
chiefly of ergodic theory. Its underlying, indeed, fundamental, object is a proba- 
bility space ( X ,  B, u),  where X is a set of states. B a a-algebra of measurable sub- 
sets of X ,  and u a countably additive nonnegative se t  function on B. u ( X )  is. of 
course, 1. Let T be an invertible injection from X onto X ;  if u ( T I E )  = u ( E )  for 
all E in B ,  T is a m e a s u r e - p r e s e r v i n g  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ;  the system ( X ,  B,  u , T ) ,  a 
basic probab i l i t y  space .  [la] 
By the o r b i t  of a measure-preserving transformation T ,  I mean the extended 
history of a single point z under T from the  infinite past to  the  infinite future: a 
trajectory from void to void. Artificially truncated a t  z ,  the system is in an initial 
state or condition. A real valued function f  :X + R, whose values correspond to  
f  ( z ) ,  f  (%), f  ( ! I % ) ,  ... acts to measure a system along its orbit; the  class of such 
measurements is defined only to the extent that f  is itself measurable: 
is thus the t ime  m e a n  of the system; 
its space mean:  systems in which the two coincide for every measurable function 
are ergodic.  
Example 9.2 Let A be an alphabet of n symbols a l ,  a2, ..., a,, with probabilities 
p l ,  pz. ... , p,.  such that pi >0, and Cpi  = 1. The product space nz consists of 
the set of all two-sided sequences in n ; the various probabilities assigned to each 
sequence induce a measure u on n z .  The shin t r a n s f i r m a t i o n  V z ) ,  = z, +l is 
measure preserving; the  system that results is a finite-valued stationary stochas- 
tic process with identically distributed terms. 
Example 9.3 Let A4 = ( a t , )  be an n x n stochastic matrix. Let p = (p l . . . . ,pn)  be 
a row probability vector fixed by M :  
Keep the product space and shift transformation from Example 9.2: Uu may be 
extended to a countably additive measure on the  algebra generated by cylinder 
sets; by the Caratheodory-Hopf theorem, Uu thus forms a measure on the Bore1 
Fields of n ' .  
Example 9.2 models, say, a doubly infinite series of coin flips. each with probabil- 
ity of one-half; Example 9.3, a regular Markov chain, where p measures the a 
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p r i o r i  probability of each symbol, M ,  the  transition probabilities from one symbol 
to  another. 
Consider a source consisting of a finite alphabet A and an associated string 
of symbols, ... zoz  i z z  ... , where each z, is an element of A.  Symbols appear in 
sequence with a fixed probability p t ;  if t he  probabilities are independent, the  
average  e n t r o p y  p e r  symbol is 
n 
H z -  C P, log2 P, a 
t =1 
H is a t  i ts  maximum if each pt = I/ n .  In general, t he  probability that  a particu- 
lar  symbol appears in sequence may depend on symbols tha t  have gone before. 
This is t rue  if the  source is a finite-state Markov device. Let A' be the  ensemble 
of all doubly infinite sequences drawn on A ;  the  cross section on A' of sequences 
that  coincide a t  a finite number of points at = zt i ,  where tt represents  any se t  of 
integers, is a c y l i n d e r  se t .  Now if A contains k le t ters ,  t h e  number of n-term 
sequences over A is k ; and each sequence is a cylinder in t he  larger space A'. I t  
is the  cylinder tha t  has a fixed probability Pr(C): the  set of all n -term sequences 
represents a finite probability space, k n  points in size. The average  a m o u n t  of 
i n f o r m a t i o n  p e r  symbol sent  out by  a source of this sor t  is 
the  entropy of the  source itself 
H = lim -I/ k C Pr  (C) logzPr(C) . 
k +- C €Cb 
The concept of a source may be  specialized to  t he  case of a measure- 
preserving system under ergodic constraints. [l9] 
The Shannon-Macmillan theorem 
A source puts out sequences; a t  any given time, t he re  will be only finitely 
many - An in fact ,  if A is a finite alphabet, and n is t he  length of each sequence. 
Finite length sequences a r e  cylinders in t he  infinite probability space determined 
by  the  source; they inherit a probability structure.  If n is sufficiently large, 
there  exists an arbitrarily small t and 6 > 0 such tha t  t he  n- term sequences may 
be separated into two groups. For the  first  
for t he  second, 
This is Shannon's theorem, a result in mathematics tha t  appears to  add an author 
in regular periods. In any case, sequences of the  f i rs t  group a re  characterized by 
the fact that ( l /n )  logZPr(C) is arbitrarily close to - H .  The probability of any 
such sequence Ct is thus z " ~ :  the  number of such sequences is ZnH, and 
- 2n logs a comprises a very smal l  share of the total number an  - of available 
sequences: a happy result. In coding a channel of communication. attention need 
be directed only to a tiny sample of the  output. 
The Stochastic Structure of an Evolutionary Source 
In considering evolution as a stochastic process, the  object of study becomes 
biological paths; and not biological words - stray proteins, say, or  bits of nucleic 
acids. The full set of paths in evolutionary space comprises an infinitely Large set 
of strings, if only because evolution appears unbounded as a natural language. The 
sheer stress on the notion of mndomness in popular accounts of evolutionary 
thought suggests a t  first that something like a pure Bernoulli process may under- 
lie the whole business, an extended coin flip by means of a coin with 20'~' 
separate faces. This is obviously absurd. Evolution is a process by which an 
ensemble of strings changes over time. Each string is composed of points - amino 
acids. in fact; the probability that  any particular point will change is arbitrary 
but low: there is little likelihood that aU points in a string will change simultane- 
ously. Transition probabilities in a neighborhood N of a set of proteins E are thus 
concentrated in that  neighborbood. 
If an ensemble of proteins occupies a certain finite se t  of states A * ,  its evo- 
lution comprises a finite s ta te  Markov process - a stochastic source satisfying 
the hypothesis of the Shannon-Macmillan theorem. 
Trapping problems 
The entropy of a source is a measure of its stochastic character: H a t  its 
maximum represents a high degree of uncertainty: all messages are  equally prob- 
able. The hypothesis of the  neo-Darwinian theory is that  evolutionary sources are 
largely random. What this means is. in fact. not entirely clear; but it surely implies 
that H  is relatively large. Let H M ,  thus be the imagined e n t r o p y  of an evolu- 
tionary source. "If the process of manufacturing messages". Chomsky and Miller 
remark, "were completely random. the  product would bear little resemblance to 
actual utterances in a natural language". [ZO] Going backward, if the utterances of 
a natural language are regular, their source is not random. To the  extent that a 
fair sample of evolutionary paths is regular, the fair load is regular as weU. A 
source specifically designed to generate the fair load of protein paths has thus 
an entropy H  
In itself, this is neither controversial nor surprising; if the degree of protein 
regularity is small, the difference between H and HMax is negligible; if Large. an 
evolutionary source over-generates.  The real issue is a matter of degree, a ques- 
tion of finesse. Linguistics. of course, suggests that if H  is very much lower than 
HMar, over-generation becomes inordinate; a stochastic source cannot, in general. 
converge on any n a t u r a l  language whose complexity is beyond the recursive 
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capacity of finite-state automata; but while life may be a language-like system, i t  is 
not necessarily like a natural language, Chinese, say, o r  even Esperanto. 
Hemoglobin chains 
Statistical entropy is a measure of uncertainty; and a measure, too, of t he  
number of alternative messages - my use of t he  word is metaphoric - tha t  a sto- 
chastic source may generate. H a t  a relative maximum indicates tha t  a source may 
send out multiple messages, a kind of energetic babble; a t  a relative minimum, H is 
cons t r a ined  - by the  rules of grammar, for example, o r  t h e  laws of logic. In t he  
case of life, Murray Eden observes, path lengths between proteins a r e  most obvi- 
ously limited by time, and evolution must be  achieved within bounds set by the  
number of generations in t he  history of an organism. Meandering paths between 
proteins are temporally inaccessible. The alpha and beta  hemoglobins. Eden 
argues, were derived by a process of evolution, one from t h e  other;  a path 
between the  two sequences must thus exist. Eden calculates tha t  this path a t  i t s  
shortest  requires something like 120 separate steps,  where each s t ep  involves a 
specific point mutation.[21] The population size of hemoglobin proteins - t h e  fair 
sample - is, he  estimates, lo6; the  rate of mutation lo*. Each s tep  in this path 
corresponds to  a positive gain in fitness: movement upward along a local gradient 
of relative perfection. In a conservative sense, i t  would take roughly 2 700 000 gen- 
erations to  convert a population of lo6 alpha hemoglobin chains to a population of 
beta hemoglobin chains. So fa r ,  so good. 
If certain paths, of whatever length, a r e  inaccessible to  life, a stochastic 
source is occluded. This is certainly what the  hypothesis tha t  life is a language- 
like system implies; i t  is implied, too, by the  fact tha t  contemporary hemoglobin 
chains exhibit relatively little var iance :  certain possible paths a r e  deficiently 
viable, ungrammatical in a sense. Nature, in passing from one chain to another, 
has evidently ra ther  a small target in mind. 
2700000 generations for t he  evolution of a protein is short: twice tha t  
number is long. Let k be a point midway between these numbers. If Hi3 comprises 
an initial set of lo6  hemoglobin chains. Pm is t he  full load of protein paths [Pi,], 
whose initial terms PI, all lie within m3. The number of targeted protein paths in 
Pm is small: so much to  do, so much to  see. The number of targeted protein paths 
tha t  reach their  target within k generations is vastly smaller: so much to  do, so 
little time. If t he  entropy of a stochastic source is great ,  t he  untargeted meander- 
ing paths a r e  ap t  to  be  favored; by contraposition, this implies tha t  t he  source 
entropy for an evolutionary system is r a the r  low; constrained, in fact ,  by the  
choice of time and targets; but what expresses these constraints, the  Darwinian 
theory does not say. 
Weizenbaum Theory 1221 
It  is a peculiarity of molecular biological strings that ,  like t he  elements of a 
natural language, they realize two spaces. These a r e  spaces with distinct and dif- 
f e r e n t  metrics: there  is no reason to  suppose tha t  they a r e  in phase. Evolution as 
a process works most directly on biological organisms, which must perish o r  per- 
severe in the  face of circumstance. To the extent  tha t  evolution is a process by 
which organisms converge over time to  some local (or global) optimal, the  
processes of convergence tha t  are sketched broadly in life must have some sub- 
stantial echo a t  the  molecular biological level. where words and strings hold sway. 
The relationship between m e t r i c  spaces that this pat tern exemplifies is quite gen- 
eral - the province, in fact, of Weizenbaum theory. Thus let M and N be two 
metric spaces, each with its own natural metric; points in M are labeled t l ,  t z .  ... , 
- points in N, e l ,  e z ,  ... . e n ;  j : M  + N is a mapping between points in M and tn  
points in N - a bijection, to make matters trivially simple. M and N are arbitrary, 
and admit of obvious specification: 
(I) M is a typographic m e t r i c  space; N, the space of biological organisms (see p 
240). 
(2) M is a typographic m e t r i c  space under the  natural m e t r i c  on words; N,  the 
same space under distance defined in terms of meaning or grammar (see pp 
245-248). 
(3) M is a typographic m e t r i c  space; N, a space of algorithms. 
Thus j might map linear sequences of DNA o r  proteins, or sets of such 
sequences, onto organisms, or  sets of organisms; equally, j might map a linear 
string of letters onto a sentence, with a fixed meaning in a natural language; or 
onto an algorithm in a given computer language such as Algol; then, too, j might 
map fixed strings in an assembly language onto a computer program. In each of 
these cases, j does not preserve metrics; M and N are not necessarily in phase. 
In addition to the natural metric on M ,  there exists an induced metric d N ( ( )  
on M defined by the following relationship: 
The Weizenbaum experiment 
To specify a Weizenbaum experiment, it is necessary to provide M with a pm- 
bability t rans i t ion system Pr determining for each point t in M the  probability 
that t will change to t '; and an in i t ia l  probability d is t r ibut ion Pro. A dis- 
t inguished element e* E N is fixed from the first. Within the context of molecu- 
lar biology, transition probabilities are focused on relatively nearby strings - this 
because point mutations result in string-Like changes of a short typographic dis- 
tance. In a biological Weizenbaum experiment, this fact is respected to the extent 
that  the typographic metric space and the probability transition system are mutu- 
ally in accord: probabilities follow typographic neighborhoods. Elsewhere, proba- 
bilities and distances are adjusted accordingly. 
A point t o  is selected in accordance with the  initial probability distribution 
Pro over M .  The distance dN(0)  from j (t  O )  to e* is measured; the system engaged 
for i = 1. 2, 3. ... ; as tt moves to t i ,  the distance d N ( t )  between j ( t t )  and e* is 
recorded. The outcome of the Weizenbaum experiment is the sequence 
d ~ ( ~ ) *  d ~ ( l ) * - - - s  d ~ ( n  ) . 
The Weizenbaum experiment is successful if: 
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Condition W For d N ( 0 )  a t  an average dis tance from e* the  sequence [ d N ( t ) {  
converges to a neighborhood of 0. 
Condition W, when met, implies that t d N ( t ) ]  is both stable and oriented. The 
graph of a sequence of points constitutes a trajectory; the se t  of trajectories in N 
that are a t  once stable and oriented is of measure zero. A successful Weizenbaum 
experiment thus establishes that Pr(M) cannot be arbitrary with respect to its 
induced metric structure. In particular, points that are f a r  in the induced 
metric have small transition probabilities: those probabilities that count must be 
concentrated on nearby objects - nearby in the sense of the induced metric. On 
the  other hand, transition probabilities over molecular biological strings are,  on 
the  neeDarwinian theory, focused on neighborhoods that a re  nearby in a natural 
metric. 
It is perhaps for this reason that. with the exception of life itself, no one 
has ever seen a successful Weizenbaum experiment. 
Eigenvalues of natural selection 
In Darwinian thought, the effects of randomness are  played off against what 
biologists call the construct ive  effects of natural selection, a mechanism that  
philosophers have long regarded with sullen suspicion. Wishing to know why a 
species that represents nothing more than a persistent snore throughout the  long 
night of evolution should suddenly (or slowly) develop a novel characteristic, the 
philosopher will learn from the definition of natural selection only that those 
characteristics that a re  relatively fit are  relatively fit in virtue of the fact that 
they have survived, and that those characteristics that have survived have sur- 
vived in virtue of the fact that they are relatively fit. This is not an intellectual 
exercise calculated to inspire confidence. 
Natural selection is a force-like concept; and, as such, acts locally if i t  acts 
a t  all. Mathematicians often assume that evolution proceeds over a multidimen- 
sional fitness surface, something that resembles a series of hills and valleys; a 
great deal that is theoretically unacceptable is often hidden in a description of its 
topology. But I am anticipating my own argument. In speaking of locality, I mean to 
evoke the  physicists's unhappiness a t  action a t  a distance. Strings that are far  
apart should be weak in mutual influence; this is a spatial constraint. Then again, 
no string should be influenced by a string that does not yet exist. This is a tem- 
poral constraint, a rule against deferred success. The historical development of a 
complex organ such as the mammalian ear  involved obviously a very long sequence 
of precise historical changes. Comparative anatomy suggests that the reptilian jaw 
actually migrated earward in the course of evolution. It is very difficult to under- 
stand why each of a series of partial changes in the anatomy of the reptilian jaw 
should have resulted in a net increase in fitness befire the  advent of the mam- 
malian ear. Certain genes within the bacterial cell, to take another example, "are 
organized into larger units under the  control of an operator, with the genes 
linearly arranged in the  order in which the enzymes to which they give rise are 
utilized in a particular metabolic pathway". [23] The genetic steps required to 
organize an operon cluster do not "confer any selective advantage to the pheno- 
type so that individual steps are  independentU.[23] The rule against deferred 
success functions as a prophylactic against the  emergence of teleological or  Aris- 
totelian thought in theoretical biology. @3] 
I have pictured evolution on the molecular level as a process involving paths; 
natural selection acts  to induce a statistical drift on some paths, and not others; 
those paths involving a positive gain in fitness are favored. A t  any particular time, 
a t  any particular place, one has an ensemble E of protein strings, embedded, so to 
speak, in an underlying probabilistic structure,  a measure-preserving system. to 
keep to  the  concepts already introduced. To this structure,  natural selection is 
grafted, and acts, presumably in virtue of a property that may be represented by 
the action of a real-valued, measure-theoretic function: thus j (z  ), j (Tz ). j (~ 'z ) .  
... are successive local calculations of fitness under the action of the system's 
transformation. the  e igenvalues  to the system. Suppose now w e  consider a 
finite-state system consisting of an alphabet of 26 letters; and the set of 
sequences k places in length. There are. of course, ~6~ such sequences. Each 
letter a$ E A occurs with a fixed and independent probability p i .  The shift 
transformation moves a given string one place to the left. In effect. this system is 
simply the finite-state stationary process with identically distributed terms men- 
tioned in the example already discussed; and may be represented as a linear array 
of k squares. An initial probability distribution fixes the configuration of the  sys- 
tem for the first (integral) moment; a t  each subsequent step, every square 
changes: the  odds in favor of any particular le t ter  appearing are 1/26. If doubly 
infinite in extent,  this system models the play of k 26-sided dice continued from 
the indefinite past to the  indefinite future. 
What are the chances, one might ask (with a marked lack of breathlessness in 
my own case). that a system of this sort  - a pure Bernoulli process - could con- 
verge on a p a r t i c d m  sentence of English? Following Mannfred Eigen. let us sup- 
pose that the sentence in question is TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MISTAKES. so that k is 
23; this is the target  sentence - S .  
Even here, poised between irrelevance and imprecision, delicate and impor- 
tant biological questions arise.@4] Thus. while it makes sense of sorts to say tha t  
for every string, there exists a target - there would be many target sentences - 
i t  makes f a r  less sense to say. as Eigen does. that there  exists a target for every 
string - just one. in fact. Fixed in advance. a target so singular would seem suspi- 
ciously like a goal and hence s t reng  verboten in evolutionary thought. How might 
such a target be represented and by what means might its influence be transmit- 
ted to strings? These are not trivial questions. 
In any event. nothing in Eigen's own example quite indicates why a stochastic 
system with a target sentence, however defined. should stop when it has reached 
its goal. This. however. is a trivial defect, easily made good by the construction of 
an evaluat ion  measure.  Suppose. for the sake of simplicity, that  fitness involves 
only a mapping from strings to 0 and 1: at  S, j ( S )  = 1, elsewhere. j is 0. An 
evaluation measure serves to size up strings in point of fitness as they appear: a t  
S, where J (S) = 1. i t  orders the  system simply to stop; a t  all other  strings, t h e  
command is to mush on. 
Stochastic device. target sentence. fitness function, and evaluation measure. 
taken as a quartet, comprise an Eigen sys tem.  The enterprising Professor William 
R. Bennett J r  has calculated that an Eigen system would require a virtually infin- 
i te  amount of time to reach even a simple target sentence - a number roughly a 
trillion times greater than the life of the universe In the same spirit. Murray 
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Eden has figured tha t  life would require something like 1013 blubbery tons of E. 
Coli "if one expected to  find a single ordered gene pair in 5 billion years". The 
trouble is not simply one of finding the  right let ters:  i t  is also the  problem of not 
losing them once they a re  found. 
What more, then,  is needed? The opportunity, Stephen Jay Gould remarks, 
for the  system to capitalize on its par t ia l  successes. Curiously enough, this is 
Eigen's answer as well, a bizarre example of independent origin and convergent 
confusion. As  Eigen works though his example, his system is designed to  retain 
those random changes tha t  fit the  target sentence. Looking a t  the  record of 
Eigen's own simulation. w e  see tha t  quite by chance the  le t te r  A appears in the  
first generation in the  right place on the  sequence. I t  stays intact, Apish so to  
speak, for t he  rest of t he  simulation. When an E pops up, it, too. gets glued to  the  
system. 
The result is an advanced Eigen sys tem,  and an improvement over t he  hope- 
lessly slow Eigen system already described. Under the  advanced Eigen system, fit- 
ness is no longer an all o r  nothing affair; f thus takes values, let  us say, between 
0 and 1. Scanning every new string, the  evaluation measure selects those strings 
si such tha t  j' (st ) > f (st These the  system retains until i t  finds a string 
superior in point of fitness. The result is a sequence of strings t h e  ascends in 
f i tness .  A t  S ,  as before, t he  system stops. 
An advanced Eigen system may well reach a target system in ra ther  a short  
time: unfortunately, in theoretical biology, as elsewhere, t h e  question is not 
whether but how. To the  ex ten t  tha t  fitness is purely a local property,  i t  is diffi- 
cult to  understand why e v e r y  ascending sequence should necessarily converge to  
a neighborhood of 1, and hence indirectly toward S. A string tha t  only partially 
conforms to  S is locally no fitter than a string tha t  remains resolutely unlike S. 
On the  o ther  hand, if each of t he  ascending sequences converge to  S i t  is very 
hard to  see  tha t  fitness is a local property,  and hard thus t o  understand what i t  is 
tha t  an evaluation measure manages to  measure. What is unacceptable is t h e  obvi- 
ous and tantalizing idea tha t  an evaluation measure judges fitness by calculating 
t h e  distance between random strings and a target sentence: distance is not a 
local property; an evaluation measure so constructed would plainly be  responding 
to  signals sent  from t h e  Beyond, a clear case of action a t  a distance. The problem 
of discovering a target sentence remains unchanged, hopeless. In fact ,  this is pre- 
cisely what the  advanced Eigen system actually measures, since an arbi t rary sen- 
tence in which A appears in t he  second position is judged fit only because i t  is 
closer to  t he  target sentence than i t  might otherwise be. When the  matter is care- 
fully explained, theoretical biologists understand a t  once tha t  the  very concept of 
a target sentence constitutes a beery and uninvited guest in evolutionary thought. 
I have taken the  argument a s t ep  fur ther  by insisting tha t  evaluation measures 
themselves be  purely local. 
Need I insist tha t  t h e  situation is made no be t t e r  if instead of a specific tar-  
get sentence I talk of systems set for success when they reach any sentence 
whatsover? I suppose, since i t  may a t  f irst  appear easier to  design a system tha t  
by randomly changing le t ters ,  in what Eigen hopefully calls the  evolution game, 
approximates an arbi t rary English sentence instead of just one. The illusion of 
ease is ill-gotten, of course: a target sentence is a minor stand-in for a major con- 
cept.  If no particular target sentence is fixed in advance, then any sentence of 
English. once reached, makes for success. Simply to  stop, t he  system must have an 
abstract characterization of all the  English sentences. Of these, there are infin- 
itely many. A system bouncing briskly from one set of random permutations to  
another, no less than the linguist or  logician, thus requires nothing less than a 
grammar of the  English language if i t  is not to  keep babbling forever. 
I have described grammars in terms of the notion of formal support; these 
concepts receive no definition in Darwinian theory. 
Notes 
[I] See my review of Michael Ruse's The Philosophy of Biology, in Philosophy of Sci- 
ence 41, Number 4, December 1974, fo r  a discussion of Smart's position, and 
related issues. 
[2] See, fo r  example. Thomas Kuhn (1970) h e  S truc ture  of S c i e n t ~ c  Revolutions 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), a book which has prompted a vast secon- 
dary l i terature and much merited soul-searching among analytic philosophers of 
science. 
[3] 'Those who are oppressed by their  own reputations." D r  Johnson remarks, "will 
perhaps not be comforted by hearing that  their  cares  a r e  unnecessary." Francis 
Crick (1966) OJMolecules a n d  Men (Seattle: University of Washington Press). 
[4] I discuss reductionism from the perspective of atomistic theories in Berlinski 
(forthcoming) The Aise of Di f f e r e n t i d  Topology (Boston: Birkhaeuser Boston). See 
also Kenneth Schaffner (1967) Approaches to reduction. Philosophy of Science 34 
(1): 137-47. 
[5] Michael Ruse has argued for  his thoroughly incoherent position in Ruse (1973) The 
Philosohy of Biology (London: Hutchinson). The concept of evolution was .  of 
course, in the European air fo r  at least a century before Danvin wrote. European 
biologists are yet unreconciled to Darwin .  In this regard. see Pierre  Grasse 
(1977) Evolut ion of Living Organisms (New York: Academic Press). The facts of 
molecular biology, i t  i s  worth stressing, are not in dispute: i t  i s  their interpreta- 
tion that remains clouded. The central  ro le  of DNA. in particular, has troubled 
many thoughtful observers. 'To at tr ibute such powers to a single substance", 
Grasse remarks 'however complicated i ts  molecular structure, is in my view aber- 
rant." 
[6] M.C. King and A.C. Wilson (1975) Evolution a t  t w o  levels in humans and chimpanzees. 
Science 88 (4184). 
171 S. Smale (1980) Z?ze Mathematics of Erne (New York: Springer). 
[8] A. Kohogorov (1967) Logical basis fo r  information theory and probability theory. 
IRZE Transact ions o n  IMormation Z?zeory IT - 14 (5). I have patterned my dis- 
cussion on: G.J. Chaitin (1974) Information-theoretic computational complexity. 
IEEE Transact ions o n  IWormation h e o r y .  IT - 20 (1). The interested reader  
should consult Chaitin's other papers. and relevant papers by Solovay. Chaitin's 
bibliography may be consulted f o r  details. 
[9] See, fo r  example, Noam Chomsky (1972) Language a n d  Mind (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace Javonovich). 
[lo] The idea of representing context-free languages by means of a system of equations 
in noncommutative variables is due to M.P. Schutzenberger. See M. Gross (1972) 
Mathematicd Models in Linguis t ics  (New Jersey: Prentice-Hail) for  details. I am 
inclined to think that the Deity, in creating the observable world, hesitated 
between programming o r  painting the  whole business. A s  a programmer, he would 
have chosen a set of recursive rules; as a painter, a system of simultaneous equa- 
tions. 
[I11 David Hull (1974) Philosophy of Bio log icd  Sciences (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall), 
although staid, contains a competent discussion of many of these issues. 
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[I21 See, f o r  example, L. Lofgren (1975) On the formalizability of learning and evolu- 
tion, in Suppes. Henkin, Joja, and Mosil (Eds) Logic, Methodology a n d  Phi losophy  
o f sc ience  (Amsterdam: North-Holland). 
[13] J. Monod (1971) Chance a n d  Necessity (New York: Alfred Knopf). 
[14] See P e t e r  Medawar (1977) The Life Sciences (London: Wildwood House). 
[15] Murray Eden (1967) Inadequacies of neo-Darwinian evolution a s  a scientific theory, 
in P. Moorhead and M. Kaplan (Eds) Mathematical Challenges to Neo-&minism 
(Philadelphia: The Wistar Institute Press).  
[I61 R.M. Thompson (1981) Mechanist ic a n d  Non-Mechanistic Science (Lynbrook, N e w  
York: Bala Books). 
[17] H.P. Yockey (1977) A calculation of the  probability of spontaneous biogenesis by 
information theory. Journal  of Theoretical Biology 67. 
[I81 See  K. Petersen (1983) Ergodic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press )  
f o r  details. 
[I91 My discussion follows tha t  of A.I. Khinchine (1957) Mathematical Foundat ions  of 
Information Theory (New York: Dover Publications). 
[20] N. Chomsky and G. Miller (1963) Finitary models of language use, in Luce, Bush, and 
Galanter (Eds) Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons). 
[21] Eden. op. c i t .  
[22] The idea of the  Weizenbaum experiment is due t o  M.P. Schutzenberger. 
[23] Eden, op. c i t .  
[24] See, f o r  example, Eigen (1971) Self-organization of matter and the  evolution of 
biological macromolecules. Die NaturwissenschqtYen 10. Together with Ruth 
Winker, Eigen has recently (1981) published a popular account of his thought 
under the  t i t le The Laws  of the  Game (New York: Harper  & Row). 
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